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Abstract
This Article offers new insights into understanding the complexities
and costs of the litigation burden that Congress has imposed on debtors
who seek a fresh start in bankruptcy. In order to explore the problems
inherent in a system that necessitates litigation as the path for obtaining
certain types of bankruptcy relief, this Article focuses on the particular
example of debtors who seek to discharge their student loans in
bankruptcy. Such debt may be discharged only if the debtor can
establish through a full-blown lawsuit that repaying the loans would
impose an undue hardship. The procedure and burdens of proof
governing undue hardship adversary proceedings have created accessto-justice barriers that ratchet up the difficulty faced by student-loan
debtors in establishing the merits of their claims for relief. Moreover,
the complexity of the litigation framework has created opportunities for
creditors to engage in unchecked, harmful practices that, to the
detriment of debtors, prejudicially distort the form in which courts
consider undue hardship claims. To demonstrate this phenomenon, this
Article examines how litigation conduct by Educational Credit
Management Corporation-a legal entity that routinely litigates against
debtors in undue hardship adversary proceedings-sometimes entails
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Funds, Inc. (In re Thurman), Ch. 7 Case No. 97-10126, Adv. No. 11-01352 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
Sept. 24, 2012), an undue hardship adversary proceeding that involved Educational Credit
Management Corporation and that this Article discusses.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

2102

[Vol. 66

procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation, both of which
exacerbate the access-to-justice barriers confronted by student-loan
debtors. Absent congressional intervention, the solution to this problem
will require bankruptcy courts to engage in more robust monitoring.
Consequently, this Article illustrates the need to pay careful attention to
procedural realities when assessing whether debtors in bankruptcy will
be able to vindicate their legal entitlements.
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INTRODUCTION

It is axiomatic that many, if not most, individual debtors seek relief
in bankruptcy because they suffer from financial distress. Moreover,
most individual debtors who file for bankruptcy do not have nonexempt
assets for distribution to their creditors.' Given debtors' lack of
resources to litigate disputes relating to their pre-bankruptcy debts, and
given the limited recoveries available to creditors, bankruptcy litigation
may simultaneously undermine a debtor's fresh start and the efficient
resolution of creditor claims against the debtor. 2 In the past, bankruptcy
reformers have urged Congress to design a bankruptcy system that
eschews complex and costly litigation. While Congress has partly
1. See Lois R. LUPICA, AM. BANKR. INST., THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CREDITOR

DISTRIBUTION STUDY 6 (2013), available at http://www.abiworld.org/e-news/Creditor.Distribu

tions.ABI.Final.pdf ("[W]e are fairly certain that of the 5.8 million chapter 7 consumer cases
filed [between 2003 and 2009], less than 6% were asset cases.").
2. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue
Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 185 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo &
Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal].
3.

See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON

THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 82 (1973); 1

NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 211-13, 216, 247-49
(1997).
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heeded such advice and crafted a Bankruptcy Code that evinces hostility
toward the litigation of disputes over pre-bankruptcy debts, 4 a
significant exception has been non-dischargeability litigation, which
"focuses on the right of a claim holder to seek post-bankruptcy
payment
'5
from the debtor on the basis of his personal liability.
This Article seeks to provide a better understanding of the
complexities and costs of the litigation burden that Congress has
imposed on debtors who seek a fresh start in bankruptcy. In order to
explore the problems inherent in a system that necessitates litigation as
the path to obtaining certain types of bankruptcy relief, this Article
focuses on the particular example of debtors who seek to discharge their
student loans in bankruptcy. If repayment of a student loan would
impose an undue hardship on the borrower, then the debt is
dischargeable in bankruptcy. This legal entitlement, however, is
difficult to vindicate: "Debtors who have filed for bankruptcy in the first
instance as a result of financial distress must somehow find the
resources to litigate a full-blown lawsuit to prove that their predicament
qualifies them for relief from their student loans." 7 Policy makers and
scholars have generally failed to provide a thorough account of the
manner in which this litigation framework imposes undue burdens on
financially distressed debtors.8 Why such burdens arise and how they
impact debtors are issues warranting closer scrutiny and explication.
In an empirical study from 2009 (the Pardo-Lacey Study), 9
Professor Michelle Lacey and I documented that legally irrelevant
factors unrelated to the merits of a debtor's claim for relief (e.g., the
level of experience of the debtor's attorney and the identity of the judge
assigned to the debtor's case) influence the extent to which a debtor
obtains a discharge of her student loans. Importantly, such factors
appear to have a stronger effect than the handful of legally relevant
factors associated with discharge outcomes.10 In light of these findings,
4. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 185-87. This

Article uses the term "Bankruptcy Code" to refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
(2012)).
5.

Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 188.

6. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
7. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 183.

8. A few journalists, however, have focused the public's attention on the litigation
burdens bome by debtors who seek relief from their student loans through the bankruptcy
process. See, e.g., Natalie Kitroeff, Student Loan Monitor's Tactics on Bankruptcy Draw
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2014, at Al; Ron Lieber, Last Plea on School Loans: Proving a
Hopeless Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2012, at Al; Katy Stech, The New Basics: Grads Skirt

Student Loans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2012, at B8.
9. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2.
10. See infra text accompanying note 136.
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the Pardo-Lacey Study concluded that, "[i]f extralegal factors
predominantly influence the extent of discharge obtained by studentloan debtors, then policymakers need to reconsider the assumptions they
have made regarding the propriety of discharge litigation in a system
oriented toward granting substantive relief to debtors."'I
A critical reevaluation of the propriety of discharge litigation
inevitably warrants a close examination of the access-to-justice barriers
that inhere within a legal framework requiring financially distressed
debtors to litigate their eligibility for forgiveness of debt. Moreover, it is
important not to lose sight of the fact that such barriers may create an
opportunity for creditors to overreach and thereby exacerbate what is
already an uphill struggle for debtors. If debtors generally are not in a
position to expend a meaningful amount of resources in presenting the
merits of their undue hardship claims, 12 then they certainly do not have
the financial wherewithal to pay the litigation costs to hold overreaching
creditors accountable. Knowing this, creditors may be tempted to ignore
procedural requirements-litigation conduct that this Article will refer
to as "procedural noncompliance"-or to espouse arguments that can be
characterized as frivolous by virtue of the "insistence on litigating a
question in the face of controlling precedents which remove[] every
colorable basis in law for the litigant's position"' 3 -1itigation conduct
that this Article will refer to as "pollutive litigation."
Procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation potentially
undermine the ability of debtors to access justice. After all, procedural
rules have an instrumental value in securing just determinations;' 4 and
15
frivolous arguments, which entail "legally inaccurate propositions,"'
threaten to derail meritorious litigation. This Article provides new
insights into understanding the access-to-justice barriers faced by
student-loan debtors in bankruptcy by taking into account the twin
threats of procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation by
creditors, as illustrated by the litigation conduct of Educational Credit
Management Corporation (ECMC), a legal entity that routinely litigates
against debtors who seek relief from their student loans through the
bankruptcy process. 16
Over the past couple of years, the media, consumer advocacy
organizations, and courts have criticized ECMC's litigation conduct. As
described in a 2012 New York Times article, student-loan debtors who
11. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 235.
12. See Robinson v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Robinson), 416 B.R. 275, 280 n.3
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009); infra text accompanying notes 233-46.
13. Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1154 (7th Cir. 1983).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
15. Williams v. U.S. Postal Serv., 873 F.2d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir. 1989).
16. See infra Section II.A.
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press their claims of undue hardship in court "face the daunting task of
arguing against opponents who specialize in beating back the bankrupt,"
including ECMC. 7 A 2013 report by the National Consumer Law
Center referred to "the highly aggressive litigation tactics of ECMC." 1 8
Similarly, according to a 2014 New York Times article, ECMC "is now
facing concerns that its tactics have grown ruthless."1 9 Finally, in a
recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirming a bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions against ECMC,
the court observed that "it was ECMC's entire course of conduct that
led the [bankruptcy appellate panel] to conclude that ECMC had abused
the bankruptcy process." 20 All of these observations suggest that
ECMC's conduct is a fertile area for exploring the question of whether
student-loan debtors in bankruptcy have had to contend with procedural
noncompliance and pollutive litigation by creditors. This Article takes
on that task.
Part I of this Article describes the procedure and burdens of proof
governing undue hardship litigation. Part II discusses how prior
empirical research of such litigation should inform thinking about the
access-to-justice issues that are the focus of this Article. Part III reveals
that such barriers enable repeat institutional creditors to engage in
unchecked careless practices that, to the detriment of debtors,
prejudicially distort the form in which courts consider undue hardship
claims. Section III.A begins by briefly describing the role of ECMC in
undue hardship adversary proceedings. Section III.B then presents data
from original empirical research documenting instances of procedural
noncompliance by ECMC in such proceedings. Section III.C discusses
an example of ECMC's pollutive litigation-the frivolous argument that
the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents a Chapter 7 debtor from
initiating an undue hardship adversary proceeding after the court has
granted a discharge in her underlying bankruptcy case. This Article
concludes that only robust monitoring by bankruptcy courts will restrain
ECMC's procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation.
I. ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE BARRIERS IN
UNDUE HARDSHIP ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS

While bankruptcy law offers debtors relief in many forms,2 ' the
17. Lieber, supra note 8.
18. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE TRUTH ABOUT STUDENT LOANS AND THE UNDUE

HARDSIPw DISCHARGE 3

(2013),

available at http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.

org/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/iulianoresponse.pdf.
19. Kitroeff, supra note 8.
20. Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hann), 711 F.3d 235, 243 (1st Cir. 2013)

(emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition

enjoins, among other things, various acts and proceedings against the debtor and his property).
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ultimate relief sought by debtors is a discharge, which generally releases
the individual from personal liability on pre-bankruptcy debts.22 This
represents bankruptcy's fresh start for debtors.23 The Bankruptcy Code,
however, singles out certain types of debts as non-dischargeable (e.g.,
debts for certain income taxes and debts for alimony, maintenance, and
child support).24 A debt for a student loan is exceptional insofar as it is
one of the few types of debt that is conditionally dischargeable in
bankruptcy (i.e., the debt is dischargeable if a certain condition exists).25
If a debtor establishes that repayment of the student loan would impose
an undue hardship, the court will deem the debt to be dischargeable.
This description might create the illusion that the path to bankruptcy
relief from educational debt is simple and straightforward. But close
examination of the structural features of undue hardship litigation
reveals that they create access-to-justice barriers for debtors. The
remainder of this Part will consider two prominent litigation featuresprocedure and burdens of proof-and describe how each feature
advantages student-loan creditors.
A. Procedure
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the Bankruptcy Rules)
classify a debt dischargeability determination as an adversary
proceeding, 27 which must be initiated by the filing of a complaint,
either by the debtor or the creditor. 29 Adversary proceedings resemble
other federal lawsuits insofar as the Bankruptcy Rules governing such
proceedings incorporate-with occasional modifications-the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 Given the intricacies of pretrial and trial
procedures, the complex nature of the process is one that will allow a
creditor to leverage its likely advantages in resources and information
against the debtor. As the Pardo-Lacey Study reported, "some creditors
may view undue hardship discharge litigation as a war that can be won
22. See id. § 524(a)(2).
23. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
25. See Douglas G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditionaland SuspendedDischarges in Anglo-

American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV.69, at 73-74, 89 (1982).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
27. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).

28. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a); see also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130
S. Ct. 1367, 1376 (2010). Adversary proceedings in bankruptcy are distinct from the debtor's
underlying bankruptcy case; the case itself constitutes an administrative matter. See Menk v.
Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 910 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (stating that "the bankruptcy
'case' is an administrative exercise that occurs under the auspices of the court, but with a
barrier ...erected between the administrative and the judicial hemispheres"). Disputes such as
adversary proceedings may, but need not, arise within the case. See id.
at 907-08.
29. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a).

30. See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. pt. VII.
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by attrition," which is to say that "creditors can inflict upon their debtor
adversaries death by a thousand cuts... [by] push[ing] the litigation
process to its limits and31 hop[ing] that, at some point along the way, the
debtor will capitulate."
There are some disquieting signs that creditors may be implementing
the attrition model in undue hardship litigation-specifically, the
duration of and the trial rate for undue hardship adversary proceedings.
Past evidence suggests that, when considering in the aggregate all
adversary proceedings nationwide, their average duration has been in
decline-to wit, from an average duration of approximately ten months
in 1993 to approximately seven and a half months in 2002. 2Professors
Douglas Baird and Edward Morrison have rightly observed that "[s]ix
months is an eternity in bankruptcy court" 33 and have concluded that the
decline in average duration "is merely additional evidence
that
34
bankruptcy judges are managing their dockets effectively.
In stark contrast to the national trend for adversary proceedings
generally, the average duration of an undue hardship adversary
proceeding in the Western District of Washington from 2002 through
2006 was approximately ten months. 35 Furthermore, while the
nationwide trial rate for all adversary proceedings declined from 16% in
1985 to approximately 5% in 2002,36 the Pardo-Lacey Study
documented a trial rate of 18% for undue hardship adversary
proceedings in the Western District of Washington from 2002 through
2006. 3
The anomalously high trial rate for undue hardship adversary
proceedings in the Western District of Washington suggests that
student-loan creditors may be waging attrition litigation on their debtor

31. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 192; cf Ted Janger,
Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIz. L.

REV. 559, 606 (2001) ("Increased expenditure by litigating parties will increase the likelihood of
success in bankruptcy court.").
32. Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A
Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 966 (2005).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Broken down by the year in which the undue hardship adversary proceedings were
commenced, the average duration was as follows: 8.1 months for 2002, 10.1 months for 2003,
11.2 months for 2004, 10.5 months for 2005, and 10.0 months for 2006. These are unreported
data derived from the Pardo-Lacey Study and are on file with the Author.
36. Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 915, 930 (2005).
37. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 210. More recent
research has documented a nationwide trial rate of 19.5% for undue hardship adversary
proceedings. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. Flaws in that research, however, call
into question the accuracy of the figure. See infra Section l.B.
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adversaries. 38 The lack of clarity regarding the vague and indeterminate39
standard of undue hardship may facilitate such litigation.
Commentators have hypothesized that the declining trial rate in
adversary proceedings generally can be explained by the evolving
certainty in decisional standards, which has increased the frequencay0
with which parties will agree on expected outcomes and thus settle.
But the same cannot be said about the undue hardship standard.
In 2005, Professor Lacey and I empirically investigated the manner
4
in which bankruptcy courts had applied the undue hardship doctrine. '
That study examined• ten years' worth of opinions• issued
by bankruptcy
•
42
courts in undue hardship discharge determinations.
The study
hypothesized that statistically significant differences would exist in the
demographic and financial characteristics of debtors who obtained a
discharge and those who did not.43 The study, however, identified few
such differences between the two groups of debtors. 44 The study
concluded that legal outcome was best explained by differing judicial
perceptions of how the same standard applied to similarly situated
debtors. 45 In other words, bankruptcy court doctrine had generally been
inconsistent in its treatment of student-loan debtors.
These findings raise several concerns. If one conceives of
bankruptcy court doctrine as serving a signaling function to litigants
regarding the likelihood of relief for the debtor,4 and if that doctrine is
generally unclear, it seems more likely that litigants will not have
overlapping expectations regarding the outcome of undue hardship
discharge proceedings.47 This state of affairs will discourage
38. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supranote 2, at 210-11.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
40. E.g., Baird & Morrison, supra note 32, at 955 ("With greater predictability, fewer
adversary proceedings should be brought and those that are brought should be more likely to
succeed, implying in turn that the likelihood of settlement should rise ....");Robert M.
Lawless, Are Bankruptcy's Trials Vanishing? IfSo, Who Cares?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 995, 1001
(2005).
41. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardshipin the Bankruptcy Courts: An
EmpiricalAssessment of the Discharge of EducationalDebt, 74 U. CN. L. REv. 405 (2005)
[hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardshipin the Bankruptcy Courts].
42. See id. at 433-38.
43. See id.
at 480-81.
44. Seeid at 481-86.
45. See id.
at 495-509.
46. See Rafael I. Pardo, Illness and Inability to Repay: The Role of Debtor Health in the
Dischargeof EducationalDebt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 505, 510 (2008).
47. See Armstrong v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Armstrong), No. 10-82092, Adv. No. 108118, 2011 WL 6779326, at *9 n. 13 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2011) ("The vagueness of section
523(a)(8) fosters litigation and inconsistency of results."); Speer v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
(In re Speer), 272 BR. 186, 191 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) ("Basically, the application of this
standard requires each court to apply its own intuitive sense of what 'undue hardship' means on
a case by case basis. With so many Solomons hearing the cases, it is no wonder the results have

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
2110

FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 66

settlement, 4 8 requiring litigants to incur more litigation costs. 49 On
balance, such costs will have a disproportionate impact on debtors who
file for bankruptcy as a result of financial distress and a lack of
monetary resources. When coupled with the complex and protracted
procedure of an adversary proceeding, the indeterminacy of the undue
hardship standard creates
an environment hospitable to attrition
50
litigation by creditors.
B. Burdens of Proof
This Section explicates how the allocation and implementation of
the burdens of proof in undue hardship adversary proceedings favor
creditors. Section I.B. 1 describes how the Bankruptcy Code's studentloan-dischargeability provision creates a bifurcated burden of proof that
creates an access-to-justice barrier for debtors. Section I.B.2 then
demonstrates that courts have implemented the provision in a way that
requires a creditor, in satisfying its burden, to establish fewer and less
complex elements than a debtor.
1. A Bifurcated Structure
An adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a
student loan entails a bifurcated burden of proof.51 The creditor "has the
initial burden to establish the existence of the debt and that the debt is
an educational loan within the statute's parameters." 52 Once the creditor
makes this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the debtor to establish
her claim of undue hardship.53
varied.").
48. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, DisputingLimited Liability, 104
Nw. U. L. REV. 853, 865 (2010); Janger, supra note 31, at 581.
49. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991).
50. If this descriptive account is accurate, "then it becomes imperative that the [undue
hardship] standard be clarified, particularly because of the adverse impact that such uncertainty
is likely to have upon a debtor's fresh start." Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,
supra note 2, at 211.
51. See, e.g., Dudley v. S. Va. Univ. (In re Dudley), 502 B.R. 259, 271 & nn.11-12
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013); Raymond v. Nw. Educ. Loan Ass'n (In re Raymond), 169 B.R. 67, 69
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994).
52. Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 916 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2013); see also Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Savage (In re Savage), 311 B.R. 835, 839 (B.A.P.
1st Cir. 2004) ("The creditor bears the initial burden of proving the debt exists and that the debt
is of the type excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8)."); Rumer v. Am. Educ. Servs. (In re
Rumer), 469 B.R. 553, 561-63 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012) ("The cases interpreting § 523(a)(8)
have held that the initial burden is on the lender to establish the existence of the debt and to
demonstrate that the debt is included in one of the four categories enumerated in § 523(a)(8).").
53. E.g., In re Savage, 311 B.R. at 839; In re Raymond, 169 B.R. at 69. This bifurcated
structure is consistent with the Supreme Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence regarding the
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Notably, although presented with an opportunity to create a burdenof-proof structure that would have tilted in favor of debtors in undue
hardship adversary proceedings, Congress instead opted for the
bifurcated structure that currently exists in the Bankruptcy Code. In the
report issued in 1973 by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, 54 the Commission proposed statutory changes to
effectuate its recommendations for reform of the bankruptcy system,
which were set forth in a model statute titled "Bankruptcy Act of
1973.55 The proposals included section 4-506(a)(8), the analogue to the
Bankruptcy Code's student-loan-dischargeability provision, which
provided as follows:
A discharge extinguishes all debts of an individual
debtor... except the following:.., any educational debt if
the first payment of any installment thereof was due on a
date less than five years prior to the date of the petition and
if its payment from future income or other wealth will not
impose an 56
undue hardship on the debtor and his
dependents[.]
Unlike the structure of the Code's student-loan-dischargeability
provision, which consists of an exception to discharge (i.e., certain
types of educational debt) and an exception within the exception to
discharge (i.e., educational debts that impose an undue hardship), the
Commission's model provision consisted merely of an exception to
discharge-specifically,
an educational debt satisfying two
requirements. 57 As explained by the Commission, not only would the
creditor have to establish that the debt had first become due less than
five years prior to the bankruptcy filing,58 the creditor would also have
to establish that the debtor would be able to repay the debt without
undue hardship. 59 Had Congress adopted the Commission's proposal,
the burden of proof in undue hardship adversary proceedings would
have rested squarely on student-loan creditors. Such an adoption would
have made the path to relief from educational debt less of an uphill
battle for debtors. But instead, Congress made a different commitment
by splitting the burden of proof between the parties.
allocation of a burden of proof when (1) a creditor seeks to claim an exception to discharge and
(2) a debtor seeks to claim an exception within the exception to discharge. See Hill v. Smith,

260 U.S. 592, 594-95 (1923).
54. COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pts. 1 & 2 (1973)
55. Id.pt. 2.
56. Id. at 136.
57. Id.at 140.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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Importantly, this access-to-justice barrier can be attributed to
suboptimal statutory design. Professor Ted Janger has argued that while
amorphous standards can be used in consumer bankruptcy cases to
regulate abuse, such as when a debtor has the ability to repay creditors,
it is crucial that the litigation burden be allocated to the debtor only if
empirical evidence suggests that the paradigmatic dispute will involve
an abusive debtor. 60 If the paradigmatic dispute will involve a
nonabusive debtor, the combination of the litigation burden and the
debtor's resource constraints61will, on balance, preclude debtors who
merit relief from obtaining it.
Unfortunately, this is precisely what has happened in the context of
undue hardship litigation. The Code's student-loan-dischargeability
provision was the product of the stereotype of an abusive student-loan
debtor, notwithstanding empirical evidence to the contrary at the time of
the provision's enactment. Moreover, prior research has repeatedly
shown that the paradigmatic undue hardship adversary proceeding
involves a nonabusive debtor. Finally, the consumer bankruptcy bar
has emphasized that many debtors do not have the financial
wherewithal to litigate an undue hardship adversary proceeding. 64 As
the Pardo-Lacey Study concluded, "[t]hat the typical debtor found
herself in dire financial straits and forced to expend resources to litigate
a claim of undue hardship strikes us as an injustice visited upon an
individual in legitimate need of relief."65 Having established this
backdrop, this Article now turns to the claim that the Code's bifurcated
structure skews undue hardship adversary proceedings in favor of
creditors.
2. A Differential Allocation That Favors Creditors
The standard of proof in undue hardship adversary proceedings is a
66
preponderance
of thethis
evidence.
Given
the bifurcated
burden
of proof
in such proceedings,
means that
the creditor
must first
establish
by a

60. See Janger, supra note 31, at 601, 619-20.
61. See id.

62. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship inthe Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 41928.
63. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 208; Pardo &
Lacey, Undue Hardship inthe Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 477.

64. See Stephanie M. Acree, Lawmakers, Others Urge Bankruptcy Change to Allow
Discharge of Private Student Loans, 25 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 868 (June 20, 2013); see also
infra notes 233-39 and accompanying text (discussing litigation costs in undue hardship
adversary proceedings).
65. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 208.
66. See Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (holding that a creditor must
prove the nondischargeability of a debt by a preponderance of the evidence); Easterling v.
Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 232 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that a debtor must establish undue
hardship by a preponderance of the evidence).
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preponderance of the evidence that the debt owed qualifies as an
educational debt excepted from discharge. 67 Upon making such a
showing, the burden of proof will then shift to the debtor to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence
that repayment of such debt would
68
impose an undue hardship.
Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, for the burden to
shift from the creditor to the debtor, the court need only find that the
evidence offered by the creditor establishes that it is more likely than
not that the debt qualifies as an educational debt. 69 Quantitatively, the
court can make such a finding if it is convinced that there is at least a
0.501 probability that the debt so qualifies.7 ° If the creditor offers a
sufficient quantum of proof, then the debt will be nondischargeable
unless the court finds that the evidence offered by the debtor establishes
that it is more likely than not (i.e., a 0.501 probability) that repayment
of the debt will impose an undue hardship.
In its decision holding that the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard applies in debt-dischargeability determinations, the Supreme
Court noted that the standard "results in a roughly equal allocation of
the risk of error between litigants." 7' If that is so, then why would the
burden of proof skew in favor of creditors in undue hardship adversary
proceedings? Simply put, in satisfying their respective burdens of proof,
the creditor has fewer and less complex elements to establish than does
the debtor. For the reasons set forth below, this translates into a much
easier evidentiary showing for the creditor.
a. The Creditor's Burden
A student loan will be excepted from discharge if the creditor
establishes that the debt is for either (1) "an educational benefit
overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental
unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution;" 72 (2) "an obligation to repay
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend;" 73 or
(3) "any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." 7
67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
69. See United States v. Arnold & Baker Farms (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 177 B.R.
648, 654 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
70. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Conjunction andAggregation,99 MICH. L. REv. 723, 725-26
(2001).
71.

See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.

72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) (2012).
73. Id. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).
74. Id. § 523(a)(8)(B).
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Importantly, the Code defines "debt" as "liability on a claim" 75 and
defines "claim" as a "right to payment." 76 Thus, the creditor bears the
burden of proof at trial to establish, among other things, the amount of
the debtor's liability under the student loan-a showing that necessarily
entails a detailed accounting of the rights to payment that arise from the
debtor's loan obligation as determined by non-bankruptcy law. 77
Admittedly, some complexity inheres in such a showing,78 and
perhaps debtors should challenge more vigorously whether the creditor
has made a prima facie showing. One line of attack could be that the
creditor has failed to establish that the debt has all of the characteristics
of an educational debt excepted from discharge. 79 Or yet another line of
attack could be that the creditor has erroneously alleged the amount of
debt owed or has failed to establish the amount owed. 80 After all,
75. Id. § 101(12).
76. Id. § 101(5)(A).
77. For example, federal regulations limit the amount of collection costs that a guaranty
agency can charge a borrower who has defaulted on a student loan under the Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP). See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(2) (2013). The regulations also
limit the amount of unpaid interest that can be capitalized on such a loan, see id.
§ 682.410(b)(4), and the sum on which interest charges can accrue, see id. § 682.410(b)(3).
These limitations circumscribe a creditor's right to payment from the student-loan debtor. Thus,
the creditor's burden of proof at trial requires it to show that any amount claimed to be a debt
for a FFELP loan does not exceed the rights to payment that may be recovered on account of
such a loan.
78. See, e.g., Bos. Univ. v. Mehta (In re Mehta), 310 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002)
("Congress did not define 'loan' in § 523, and courts that have been called upon to interpret that
provision have not agreed upon its meaning.").
79. Examples of possible challenges include: (1) whether the debtor's financial obligation
constitutes a debt for an educational loan, see, e.g., id.at 312-16; Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw
(In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2000); (2) whether an educational loan was made
under a program funded by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, see, e.g., O'Brien v.
First Marblehead Educ. Res., Inc. (In re O'Brien), 419 F.3d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2005) (per
curiam); or (3) whether the debtor's financial obligation constitutes a qualified education loan,
see, e.g., Rumer v. Am. Educ. Servs. (In re Runer), 469 B.R. 553, 561-63 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
2012).
80. The possibility exists that the parties to an undue hardship adversary proceeding could
"seek liquidation of the [student-loan] debt as a contested issue." Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 916 n.13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). In fact, federal regulations
indicate that, if cost-effective, guaranty agencies should do so with respect to federally
guaranteed student loans that are in default. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1)(iv)(B).
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding that a bankruptcy court is constitutionally
prohibited from entering a final judgment on a state law tortious interference counterclaim, see
Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2610-11 (2011), a bankruptcy court would arguably have
constitutional authority to reduce a student-loan debt to judgment, see Deitz v. Ford (In re
Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 23 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (stating that "Stern is altogether reconcilable
with. . . the bankruptcy court's authority to enter final judgments in actions to determine
dischargeability and for liquidation of a creditor's claim"). But see Douglas G. Baird, Blue
Collar ConstitutionalLaw, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 4 (2012) (stating that "the Supreme Court's
opinion in Stern v. Marshall puts the matter [of a bankruptcy judge entering judgment on a non-
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institutional student-loan creditors are not paragons of accurate financial
recordkeeping. 81 But debtors routinely appear to passively accept the
creditor's allegations and evidence, 82 in all likelihood because they lack
the resources
to mount challenges undercutting the creditor's prima
83
case.
facie
The possibility of such challenges aside, it would nonetheless be fair
to characterize the three alternatives for establishing the existence of an
educational debt excepted from discharge as "crystalline, highly specific
statutory provisions that, while difficult to penetrate, leave little to the
imagination." 84 Yet, notwithstanding the precision and clarity of these
statutory elements, evidence suggests that some courts fail to rigorously
apply the law as written 85-that is, they apply a lax interpretive
approach favoring creditors who already enjoy a substantively relaxed
burden relative to debtors. In implementing such an approach, courts
contravene the longstanding and widely held principle that exceptions to
86
discharge should be narrowly construed in favor of dischargeability.
dischargeable debt] in doubt"). Likewise, the bankruptcy court would have constitutional
authority to determine the dischargeability of the debt owed to the student-loan creditor. See
Dudley v. S. Va. Univ. (In re Dudley), 502 B.R. 259, 270-71 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013).
81. See, e.g., Rof-IT CHOPRA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN 13 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.

gov/f/201210_cfpbStudent-Loan-Ombudsman-Annual-Report.pdf (noting that "[s]ome of the
deficiencies identified in the mortgage servicing industry might also exist in student loan
servicing," including "inappropriate application of payments"); Tara Siegel Bernard, Sallie Mae
to Pay Fine over Loans to Troops, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at B4 ("Sallie Mae, the giant
student lender, and Navient, previously a loan servicing unit of Sallie Mae, have agreed to pay
$97 million to settle allegations by federal regulators that military service members were
charged excessive interest and fees on student loans.").
82. See, e.g., In re Roth, 490 B.R. at 916 n.13 (noting debtor's stipulations "that the loans
in question were educational loans as contemplated in § 523(a)(8)" and "that the loans had an
outstanding aggregate balance of no less than $95,403.86" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Sperazza v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sperazza), 366 B.R. 397, 406-407 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 2007) ("Neither party has suggested that plaintiff's debts to ECMC are anything other than
educational loans made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under a program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or non-profit institution."). For an example of
an undue hardship adversary proceeding involving a debtor who refused to accept the creditor's
allegations and evidence and who ultimately prevailed as a result of the creditor's failure to
carry its burden of proof, see Anderson v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re
Anderson), Ch. 7 Case No. 02-51298, Adv. No. 03-4034, slip op. at 2-3 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
Apr. 22, 2004), ECF No. 44.
83. See infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text; see also Janger, supra note 31, at 598
(discussing the practical limits on judicial involvement in consumer bankruptcy cases and noting
that "[d]ebtors cannot afford to pay their lawyers to appear at contested hearings").
84. Janger, supra note 31, at 560.
85. See Campbell v. S.Or. Univ. (In re Campbell), BAP No. OR- l-1342-JuMkH, slip
op. at 26-27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (Markell, J., dissenting), available at
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/bap/2013/07/29/CampbellDecision.pdf.
86. See, e.g., Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998).
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That the undue hardship standard itself may exact a stringent
evidentiary burden on debtors seeking relief (as discussed below) is
irrelevant. The bifurcated evidentiary framework that Congress has
created requires courts to put student-loan
creditors to their proofs
87
before shifting the burden to debtors.
b. The Debtor's Burden
In stark contrast to creditors, debtors face a much greater hurdle in
carrying their burden of proof in undue hardship litigation. As a formal
matter, two primary factors create this hurdle: (1) the inordinately
complex nature of the undue hardship calculus; and (2) the manner in
which the dominant rule of decision governing such proceedings has
fractionated the burden of proof.
i. Undue Hardship's Complexity
First, consider the manner in which the undue hardship standard has
evolved to consist of "myriad doctrinal factors,"88 which force debtors
to contend with a much more exhaustive evidentiary checklist than
creditors. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define undue
hardship, a variety of judicially created rules have filled this statutory
interstice.8 9 The current legal landscape essentially consists of two tests
for undue hardship: (1) the test that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit set forth in Brunner v. New York State HigherEducation
Services Corp.9° (the Brunner test), and (2) the totality-of-thecircumstances test (the totality test).
To prevail on a claim of undue hardship under the Brunner test, a
debtor must establish:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current
income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for
herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of
the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the

87. For examples of courts that properly held a student-loan creditor to its evidentiary
burden and in doing so applied the principle that exceptions to discharge should be narrowly
construed in favor of dischargeability, see Boston University v. Mehta (In re Mehta), 310 F.3d
308, 311-17 (3d Cir. 2002), and Ray v. University of Tulsa (In re Ray), 262 B.R. 544, 548-52
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2001).
88. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardshipin the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 488.

89. See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir.
2003).
90. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
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debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. 9 1
Over time, as courts have sought to further flesh out the factors that
ought to be considered in determining whether a debtor has satisfied
each element of the Brunner test, its "constituent elements ... have

become encrusted with many doctrinal pronouncements." 92 For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified
a non-exhaustive list of twelve factors that a debtor may rely upon to
establish a future inability to repay the student loan (i.e., the second
element of the Brunner test). 9 In somewhat similar fashion, one
bankruptcy court has set forth seven relevant factors for consideration in
determining whether the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the
student loan (i.e., the third element of the Brunner test).94 With the
evolution of the Brunner test, the undue hardship standard has become
quite complex-to wit, multifactor considerations proliferating within a
multifactor test.
The totality test, on the other hand, requires consideration of "(1) the
debtor's past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources;
(2) a calculation of the debtor's and her dependent's reasonable
necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and
circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case." 95 Although
the totality test does not expressly reference a debtor's good faith efforts
to repay the student loan, "it certainly leaves the door open to such a
consideration, given its reference to 'other relevant facts and

91. Id. at 396. For an in-depth analysis of the origins of the Brunner test, see Bene v.
Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Bene), 474 B.R. 56, 62-68 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
2012).

92. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 196.
93. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys), 446 F.3d 938, 946-47 (9th Cir.
2006). Moreover, amendments to the Code's student-loan dischargeability provision have had
the effect of creating, in a formal legal sense, a temporally unbounded framework for
ascertaining a debtor's future inability to repay the student loan. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue
Hardshipin the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 513 n.415. Thus, a debtor must not only
prove a negative-a difficult proposition in and of itself-but must also prove that negative in
the context of an unbounded time horizon-an even more difficult proposition. See Wolfe v.
U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Wolfe), 501 B.R. 426, 434 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) ("How does a
debtor. . . prove that financial circumstances will not improve in the future, a 'future' which
was five years long when the Brunner test was first adopted, but which may now be 25 years or
longer?"); Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 198.
94. See Stupka v. Great Lakes Ed. (In re Stupka), 302 B.R. 236, 243-44 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2003).
95. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003);
see also Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 797-800
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010) (discussing and adopting the totality test). For a discussion on the origins
of the totality test, see Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note
41, at 488 n.348.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
2118

FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66

circumstances.' 96 And, in fact, courts applying the totality test have
signaled that a debtor's good faith is a relevant consideration in
analyzing a debtor's claim of undue hardship. 97 Moreover, just as with
considerations have likewise proliferated
the Brunner test, multifactor
98
test.
totality
the
under
Whether under the Brunner test or the totality test, courts have made
the debtor's evidentiary burden increasingly complex, and thus
difficult, 99 by setting forth a panoply of facts and circumstances that are
relevant to the undue hardship calculus. Granted, "[i]t may be
reasonable to conclude that a court should have the discretion to
dispense particularized justice on a case-by-case basis where Congress
has spoken with broad, general pronouncement rather than highly
specific language."' 00 And notably, jurists have echoed this view when
commenting on the open-textured nature of the undue hardship
standard. '0 '_
What has been troubling about the evolution of the standard,
however, has been the trend whereby the interpretation by some courts
has gone well beyond the broad contours of the statutory language, with
the result that an "impermissible judicial gloss" has permeated the
legislative enactment.' 0 2 Perhaps the most extreme example of this has
been the manner in which courts have "framed [the debtor's]
96. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 489.
97. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 783-84 (8th Cir.
2009) (Smith, J., concurring); Bronsdon, 435 B.R. at 800. The approach of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel of the First Circuit to the totality test does not require the debtor to establish
good faith in the first instance, but rather places the burden on the creditor to establish the
debtor's bad faith. See id.
98. See Jesperson,571 F.3d at 783-84 (Smith, J., concurring) (listing nine factors).
99. See, e.g., id. at 779 (describing debtor's burden of proof as "rigorous"); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing
debtor's burden of proof as a "difficult burden"). The difficulty obviously does not stem from
the standard of proof-the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard-which applies equally to
the creditor in establishing that the debt qualifies as an educational debt excepted from
discharge. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71. Accordingly, the observation that studentloan debtors face a difficult burden must be attributable to the perception that, when juxtaposed
against the substantive law defining the creditor's evidentiary burden, the substantive law
defining the debtor's evidentiary burden is much more complex.
100. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 520; cf
Janger, supra note 31, at 601 ("In the Bankruptcy Code, muddy rules are used to allow a judge
to determine whether abusive behavior has occurred.").
101. See, e.g., Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 885 (7th Cir. 2013);
Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003); Roth v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 923 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013) (Pappas, J.,
concurring).
102. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 520. For
statutory arguments regarding the proper application of the undue hardship standard, see id. at
509-19.
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evidentiary burden in terms 1of
the overwhelmingly subjective phrase
'certainty of hopelessness."' 0 3 Such framing has been criticized,1 0 4
most notably by Judge Frank Easterbrook, who rebuked a prior panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for having adopted
that evidentiary frame. ° 5 Judge Easterbrook sounded a clarion call,
reminding courts that "[i]t is important not to allow judicial glosses,
such as the language in Roberson and Brunner, to supersede the statute
itself' 0 6 Nonetheless, the fact remains that debtors face a much greater
evidentiary burden than creditors in undue hardship adversary
proceedings due to the asymmetrical design of the Code's student-loandischargeability provision-specifically, a relatively bright-line rule for
establishing the creditor's prima facie case and a vague and
indeterminate standard for establishing the debtor's prima facie case.
ii. Fractionating the Debtor's Burden of Proof
What is even more troubling is that the Brunner test has fractionated
the debtor's burden of proof, which forces debtors in Brunner
jurisdictions to marshal a greater amount of evidence to prevail on a
claim of undue hardship. A debtor bears the burden of proof to establish
each element of the Brunner test by a preponderance of the evidence;
failure to do so with respect to any element results in a finding of
nondischargeability. 107 By articulating the evidentiary burden in this
fashion, courts have infused the undue hardship calculus with the issue
of "conjunctive probability,"' 0 8 which requires an assessment of the
"conjoined probability that [multiple requirements] are true at the same
1 °9
time.
To make this assessment, the factfinder ought to apply the "product
rule," which entails "multiplying the probabilities associated with
several.., requirements in order to assess a combined likelihood."' 10
Importantly, applying the product rule without modification is

103. Id. at 492 n.363 (citing bankruptcy court cases).
104. See, e.g., Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 28 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2005) ("Requiring the debtor to present additional evidence of 'unique' or 'extraordinary'
circumstances amounting to a 'certainty of hopelessness' is not supported by the text of
§ 623(a)(8) [sic]."); Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791,
799-800 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010) (quoting approvingly the analysis in Hicks which criticized the
"certainty of hopelessness" evidentiary frame).
105. See Krieger, 713 F.3d at 885.
106. Id. at 884.
107. See, e.g., Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d
324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2001).
108. Levmore, supra note 70, at 723.
109. Id. at 726.
110. Id. at 723.
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appropriate only when the requirements are independent."' If there is
some, but not complete, interdependence between the multiple
requirements, then the factfinder should apply the product rule with
some adjustment to account for the partial interdependence between the
requirements. 112 Finally, if the "multiple requirements are entirely
interrelated, application of the product rule is unnecessary,""' 3 in which
case we ought to question the imposition of multiple requirements in the
first instance. 114
With this backdrop in mind, consider how the issue of conjoined
probability arises within the framework of the Brunner test, which
essentially requires a debtor to establish: (1) a current inability to repac
(2) a future inability to repay, and (3) a good faith effort to repay.
First, assume that the three elements are independent, which is not an
unreasonable assumption." 6 This assumption warrants application of
the product rule without modification. If the bankruptcy judge
concludes that there is a 0.8 probability of a current inability to repay, a
0.8 probability of a future inability to repay, and a 0.7 probability of a
good faith effort to repay, the combined probability that the debtor has
established all three Brunner elements is 0.448. In other words, the
bankruptcy judge would have to conclude that the debtor failed to
establish undue hardship by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
when the product rule applies, debtors must produce a greater amount of
evidence to surpass the preponderance-of-the-evidence threshold than
they would be required to marshal if the product rule were inapplicable.
One can look to the totality test in support of this claim.
The evidentiary framework under the totality test casts the undue
hardship calculus as a single question requiring an affirmative answer
based on the evidence taken as a whole," thereby eschewing the issue
of conjoined probability. Courts that apply the totality test have
implicitly suggested as much."18 Moreover, at least one bankruptcy
111. See id. at 726 n.4.
112. Seeid. at 728.
113. Id. at 727.
114. See id.

115. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
116. For example, the Ninth Circuit has formally decoupled the first Brunner prong (i.e.,
current inability to repay) from the second Brunner prong (i.e., future inability to repay) by
establishing a presumption against a debtor who has established a current inability to repayspecifically, that the debtor's income will increase over time to a level permitting repayment
while maintaining a minimal standard of living. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re
Nys), 446 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2006).
117. Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 800 (B.A.P.
1st Cir. 2010).
118. See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003)
("We are convinced that requiring our bankruptcy courts to adhere to the strict parameters of a
particular test would diminish the inherent discretion contained in § 523(a)(8)(B).").
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judge has openly lamented119the constraints imposed by the Brunner test
relative to the totality test.
The scope of the conjunction problem is significant given the
widespread adoption of the Second Circuit's Brunner test. The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all formally adopted the Brunner test
120
as the framework for analyzing a debtor's claim of undue hardship.
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has not adopted the Brunner test, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia applies the Brunner test in undue hardship
adversary proceedings.
Moreover, even though (1) the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has not formally adopted a test for undue
hardship, 122 (2) the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit
has rejected the Brunner test in favor of the totality test, 12 3 and (3) the
majority of bankruptcy courts within the First Circuit apply the totality
test; 124 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Hampshire
125
nonetheless applies the Brunnertest.
Thus, the overwhelming majority of student-loan debtors-that is,
all debtors in ten of the twelve federal regional circuits and some
debtors in the First Circuit-must satisfy their burden of proof within
the Brunner framework. 126 Given the conjunction problem that has been
judicially infused into that framework, the heightened evidentiary
burden represents yet27 another access-to-justice barrier confronted by
student-loan debtors. 1

119. See Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 920, 923 & n.17
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013) (Pappas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Brunner analysis "is too
narrow, no longer reflects reality, and should be revised by the Ninth Circuit" and also that
"bankruptcy courts should be free to consider the totality of a debtor's circumstances in deciding
whether a discharge of student loan debt for undue hardship is warranted").
120. Pardo, supra note 46, at 514 & n.34.
121. See Zook v. Edfinancial Corp. (In re Zook), Ch. 7 Case No. 05-00083, Adv. No. 0510019, 2009 WL 512436, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2009).
122. See Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir.
2006).
123. Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 800 (B.A.P.
1st Cir. 2010).
124. See id at 798 & n.10.
125. Seeid at798&n.11.
126. Debtors within the Eighth Circuit must satisfy their burden of proof within the
framework of the totality test. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
127. At least one bankruptcy court has recognized as much. See Wolfe v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ. (In re Wolfe), 501 B.R. 426, 434 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) ("Over time, courts have
grafted sub-elements to each of the three parts of the Brunner test. Proof of these sub-elements
may force debtors into inconsistent positions or difficult burdens of proof.").
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II. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF UNDUE HARDSHIP LITIGATION
Having described the way in which the procedures and burdens of
proof in undue hardship adversary proceedings have made it more
difficult for student-loan debtors to establish the merits of their claims
for relief, this Part discusses how prior empirical research of undue
hardship litigation should inform thinking about these access-to-justice
issues.
A. The Pardo-Lacey Study
The Pardo-Lacey Study analyzed trial-level outcomes of adversary
proceedings in bankruptcy where debtors sought to discharge their
student loans. 128 The goal of the study was to ascertain whether it is
problematic that the current bankruptcy system necessitates litigation as
the path to relief from educational debt. To make this determination, the
study focused on the litigation of undue hardship adversary proceedings
commenced in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Washington during the five-year period spanning 2002 through 2006.129
Because the data were confined to the experience of litigants in a single
federal judicial district during a half-decade period, it cannot be said
that the data are representative of undue hardship litigation nationally,
including the profile of debtors who seek such a discharge. Nonetheless,
the data shed light on the profile of certain student-loan debtors who
have looked to the bankruptcy system for relief from their educational
debt.
The average student-loan debtor in the Pardo-Lacey Study suffered
from severe financial distress. Consider the following statistics, keeping
in mind that all dollar amounts from the study have been converted to
2013 dollars for purposes of this Article: 13 The average debtor's
household generated an annual income of $24,045.13 After accounting
for annual household expenses exclusive of those relating to the debtor's
student loans, the average debtor's household operated at an annual
deficit of $5,222 (i.e., -$5,222 of annual disposable household
income).1 32 In other words, the average debtor's household did not have
any excess income to repay the debtor's student loans, which for the
average debtor amounted to $87,882.133
128. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2.
129. See id. at 202-03.
130. See The Cost of Living Calculator, AM. INST. FOR ECON. RES.,
https://www.aier.org/cost-living-calculator (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
131. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 208 tbl.2.
132. See id.
133. See id. For further details regarding the financial circumstances of student-loan
debtors in the Pardo-Lacey Study, see id. at 206-08.
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In terms of substantive outcome, the discharge of student loans
appeared to be the rule rather than the exception in the Western District
of Washington during the time period of the Pardo-Lacey Study:
Approximately 57% of the adversary proceedings resulted in some
amount of debt discharged (whether through settlement or trial), with
the average debtor obtaining a discharge of approximately 62% of his
educational debt. 134 At first blush, it appeared that the debtors in that
study experienced a moderate rate of success. Further considerations,
however, suggested concerns about the manner in which litigating a
claim of undue hardship encroached upon a student-loan debtor's fresh
start.
The Pardo-Lacey Study sought to identify the factual characteristics
surrounding a debtor's undue hardship claim that were statistically
significantly associated with the extent to which the debtor's student
loans were discharged. The study considered factual characteristics that
the legal doctrine would deem relevant (e.g., the debtor's age, health
status, and employment status) and irrelevant (e.g., the experience level
of the debtor's attorney and the identity of the judge assigned to the
35
debtor's adversary proceeding) to the merits of the debtor's claim.'
The study made the following disquieting revelations: (1) Legally
irrelevant characteristics were associated with legal outcome, and
(2) those characteristics were more strongly associated with legal
outcome than were the handful of legally relevant characteristics. 36
The Pardo-Lacey Study's findings suggest that nondoctrinal case
characteristics, which have no legal relevance to, and thus should have
no bearing on, the amount of debt discharged, do influence the
substantive outcome of undue hardship litigation. The fact that such
characteristics predominate the group of determinants, and generally
have a greater effect on outcome than the doctrinal determinants,
suggests that undue hardship litigation improperly curtails access to
justice for student-loan debtors who legitimately need relief from their
financial distress. Consider the finding that representation by a highly
experienced attorney was positively associated with the extent of
discharge. 37 One might characterize this situation as a lack of access to
justice that results from excessive search costs preventing student-loan
debtors from finding the highly experienced attorneys who will provide
better chances of obtaining extensive relief. Or perhaps the situation can
be characterized as the product of a principal-agent problem where, for
134. Id. at213.
135. Id.
136. The discussion below, infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text, is excerpted (with
some modification) from Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 22935.
137. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 227, 228 tbl.9.
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some reason,
less-experienced attorneys fail to act in their clients' best
1 38
interests.
A principal-agent problem may also be linked to the finding from
the Pardo-Lacey Study that early settlement-before the court set a trial
date-yielded more extensive relief for debtors.' 39 The decision to settle
and the point in time at which to do so are considerations for which a
debtor will rely upon her attorney for guidance.' 40 If the fee
arrangement between the debtor and her attorney discourages the
attorney from recommending settlement, 14 1 the debtor may end up being
steered to a procedural posture that works to the disadvantage
of the
42
debtor but to the financial advantage of the attorney.1
While the data from the Pardo-Lacey Study cannot validate any of
these hypotheses, these issues may have been underlying elements of
the nondoctrinal determinants of the extent of discharge. If so, this
warrants a serious reevaluation of Congress's decision to structure a
system that requires debtors to litigate their claims for forgiveness of
student-loan debt.
B. The Juliano Study
More recently, Jason luliano conducted an empirical study of
student-loan-discharge litigation (the Luliano Study). 14' This study
claimed to offer four primary contributions to the existing research on
the subject. First, the study was based on a nationwide sample207 adversary proceedings that were commenced in 2007;144 because of
this "broader geographic scope," the study emphasized that its "results
[were] more generalizable" than prior research. 14 5 Second, the Iuliano
Study included "all adversary proceeding outcomes" (i.e., dismissals,
default judgments, settlements, and trial verdicts) in its analyses 14to6
provide a complete view of the landscape of student loan discharges.
138. See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of IndividualizedJustice: Consumer Bankruptcy
as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR.

L.J. 397,406 (1994).
139. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 227,228 tbl.9.
140. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains,Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 113, 172 (1996).
141. See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting
that "fee-only arrangements may be vulnerable to abuse by attorneys seeking to advance their
own interests without due regard for the interests of debtors"); Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078 (1984).
142. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 211-12.
143. Jason luliano, An EmpiricalAssessment of Student Loan Dischargesand the Undue
Hardship Standard,86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012).
144. Id. at 502-03.
145. Id. at499.
146. Id. at 499-500.
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Third, using data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, the
147
luliano Study estimated a financial profile of non-discharge seekers.
The study's comparisons of discharge seekers and non-discharge
seekers revealed similarly situated groups, and thus suggested that more
non-discharge seekers should file undue hardship adversary
proceedings. 148 Finally, the study's regression analyses identified three
statistically significant factors associated with discharge relief: (1) the
debtor's health status, (2) the debtor's employment status, and (3) the
debtor's income during the year prior to the petition date.' 49 The study
reported that these ' factors
revealed "some degree of consistency in the
50
judicial decisions."'
The Juliano Study ultimately concluded that any arguments pointing
to access-to-justice barriers in this setting are overstated:
[T]he major flaw in the system is not inconsistent
application of the undue hardship standard, but rather the
fact that 99.9 percent of student loan debtors in bankruptcy
never attempt to get a discharge.
Given that the cost of pursuing a student loan
discharge is relatively low compared to the cost of filing
bankruptcy, this statistic is even more surprising. Add on
the fact that there is no statistically significant difference in
outcomes between debtors without attorneys and debtors
with attorneys, and one cannot help but wonder why more
people in bankruptcy do not seek to discharge their student
loans. Ultimately, it seems that bankruptcy filers' lack of
accurate knowledge of the system is the main problem. 15 '
Simply put, according to the Juliano Study, more
52 non-discharge seekers
should seek an undue hardship determination.1
A report issued by the National Consumer Law Center (the NCLC
Report) critiqued the luliano Study because its conclusions "may leave
readers with the false impression that it is not so difficult for consumers
to discharge student loans in bankruptcy."' 153 The NCLC Report does
147. See id. at 500, 504, 507 & n.54, 510-12. luliano uses the term 'non-discharge
seekers' to signify the debtors who filed for bankruptcy but did not seek to discharge their
student loans." Id. at 500.
148. Id. at 500.
149. Id.at 501.
150. Id.

151. Id. (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 525 ("Rather than condemn the undue hardship requirement, members of the
bankruptcy community should encourage debtors with legitimate need to file adversary
proceedings even if they cannot hire an attorney. Courts are willing to grant discharges. The
problem is that few people are asking for them.").
153. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 1.
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not challenge the study's central point-namely, that "few consumers
who file for bankruptcy try to have a bankruptcy judge decide if their
student loans can be discharged."' 154 The report nonetheless argues that
"the study's conclusions beyond this [central] point are not supported
by the empirical data and ignore the plain realities facing student loan
borrowers."' 5 5 In making this argument, the NCLC Report "highlights
the shortcomings of the luliano
' 56study and sets the record straight on
bankruptcy."'
in
hardship
undue
The remainder of this Section explains why the NCLC Report's
concerns are well founded. A close examination of the luliano Study
reveals that its conclusions rest on shaky ground as a result of
(1) sampling bias, (2) poor coding protocols for relief, and
(3) misconceptions of the legal landscape. This Article next discusses
these problems in turn.
1. Sampling Bias
The luliano Study's sampling methodology provides the first reason
to question its conclusions. Sampling bias is systematic error arising due
to sample selection that can potentially skew findings. In other words,
the sample selected will not accurately represent the target population.
The study's selection of time-period constraints, its approach to using
PACER, and the manner in which it identified party names to use as
search terms for finding adversary proceedings all raise concerns
regarding systematic error in constructing the study's sample.
a. Time-Period Constraints
The luliano Study first restricted its search to bankruptcy cases that
were filed in 2007.157 It then appears that the Iuliano Study searched for
158
adversary proceedings filed in 2007 in connection with those cases.
This approach necessarily omits adversary proceedings filed in 2007 in

154. Id.
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. See luliano, supra note 143, at 502.
158. See id. at 502, 504. luliano never specifies whether his sample includes adversary
proceedings that were filed in years subsequent to the calendar year in which the debtor
commenced his bankruptcy case. He states that "most debtors filed an adversary proceeding
within six months of their initial voluntary petition." Id. at 510. But he does not indicate whether
adversary proceedings filed after 2007 are included in the sample. In a podcast discussing his
study, however, luliano does state that his study was confined to adversary proceedings filed in
2007. Study on Student Loan Discharges and the Undue HardshipStandard,AM. BANKR. INST.
06:16-06:21 (Dec. 4, 2012), http://news.abi.org/podcasts/125-study-on-student-loan-dischargesand-the-undue-hardship-standard ("I used PACER . ..to find debtors who filed adversary
proceedings in 2007 to discharge their student loans.").
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connection with cases that were commenced prior to 2007.159 The
NCLC Report noted this possibility
in expressing its concern over the
•
160
Study.
luliano
the
of
scope
temporal
The temporal focus of the luliano Study potentially skews its
findings. For example, 38% (44 of 115) of the undue hardship adversary
proceedings filed in the Pardo-Lacey Study related to bankruptcy cases
that were commenced in a calendar year prior to the filing of the
adversary proceeding. 161 The median and mean number of days between
the commencement of the bankruptcy case (the petition date) and the
filing date of the adversary proceeding for this group of debtors (the
delaying filers) were, respectively, 236 days and 620 days. In stark
contrast, for the group of debtors who filed their adversary proceeding
in the same calendar year as their bankruptcy case (the non-delaying
filers), both the median and mean number of days between the petition
date and the filing date of the adversary proceeding were 91 days.
With time comes change, so it is not hard to imagine that the
circumstances surrounding the claim of undue hardship for the delaying
filers could be very different than those of the non-delaying filers. 1 2 In
the Pardo-Lacey Study, 67.7% of the non-delaying filers were
employed as of the petition date, and that number dropped to 61.8% by
the time they filed their adversary proceeding. In contrast, 60.0% of the
delaying filers were employed as of the petition date, and that number
dropped to 48.6% by the time they filed their adversary proceeding. In
other words, the delaying filers became unemployed at a greater rate
than the non-delaying filers. Thus, it is quite possible that the decision
to exclude delaying filers biased the Iuliano Study's sample. Such a bias
would be highly relevant given that the study found a statistically
significant association
between the debtor's employment status and
63
discharge outcomes.'
b. PACER Approach
The Juliano Study's use of PACER to construct its sample is also
problematic. The study relied on the PACER Case Locator,-"a

159. See infra notes 443-45 and accompanying text (discussing timing rules for
commencement of an undue hardship adversary proceeding).
160. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supranote 18, at 5.
161. These are unreported data derived from the Pardo-Lacey Study, which is described in
supra Section II.A.
162. Post-discharge events and circumstances are relevant in evaluating a debtor's undue
hardship claim. See, e.g., Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 1227,
1231 (8th Cir. 2011); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108,
1112-13 (9th Cir. 1998); Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R.
791, 800 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010).
163. See Juliano, supra note 143, at 501, 520.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
2128

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

national index for U.S. district, bankruptcy, and appellate courts" 164-to
locate the adversary proceedings for the study. 5 The Luliano Study
explained that it resorted to using a party name search because of the
Case Locator's limited search capabilities, specifically noting that "no
way exists to restrict results to student loan discharges or even to locate
adversary proceedings more generally."'1 66 The luliano Study further
noted that, although student-loan adversary proceedings are assigned a
specific Nature-of-Suit Code (NOS Code), 67 that code could not be
used to construct the study's sample: "Individual district court databases
do have a limited 'Nature of Suit' search function. Unfortunately, it is
impossible
to search by the Nature of Suit code for student loan
8
16

cases."

These explanations present an incomplete picture of the way in
which researchers can use PACER to construct a proper sample for
studying student-loan adversary proceedings. First, the luliano Study's
reference to "[i]ndividual district court databases" 169 is perplexing.
Because student-loan adversary proceedings are routinely commenced
in a bankruptcy court, the individual PACER databases for each
bankruptcy court are the relevant databases for finding student-loan
adversary proceedings. The "Query" search function for these databases
permits searches for adversary proceedings by NOS Code, including the
code for student-loan adversary proceedings: "63 (Dischargeability523(a)(8), student loan)."' 170 Accordingly, the study's assertion
regarding the impossibility of searching for student-loan adversary
proceedings by NOS Code is incorrect, subject to the caveat below.
Search functionality by NOS Code in PACER's bankruptcy court
databases has not always been possible. For example, this functionality
did not exist when the Pardo-Lacey Study was conducted in 2007.
Accordingly, it may be that the search functionality by NOS Code was
unavailable during the luliano Study. But even so, the study could have
searched for adversary proceedings generally-which the study claimed
was impossiblel1l-by utilizing the individual PACER databases for
164. PACER Case Locator, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/pcl.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2014).

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See luliano, supra note 143, at 501 & n.35.
Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
Id.at 502 n.40.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

170. See, e.g., QUERY, https://ecf.mab.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/iquery.pl (last visited Oct. 30,
2014) (subscription required) (displaying search options for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Massachusetts); QUERY, https://ecf.wawb.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/iquery.pl (last visited
Oct. 30, 2014) (subscription required) (displaying search options for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Washington).
171. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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each bankruptcy court. 172 The "Docket Activity Report" search function

for these databases permits searches for adversari7 3 proceedings
generally, by selecting "ap" as the relevant case type.

Accordingly,

the assertion regarding the impossibility of searching for adversary
proceedings generally is also incorrect.
Ultimately, the luliano Study resorted to a suboptimal search process
for constructing its sample-namely, using the PACER Case Locator
and its extremely limited search functionality. 174 The Case Locator's
search template for bankruptcy cases limits searches to fields related

either to the bankruptcy case (e.g., case number, case title, chapter, date
filed) or to a party (i.e., party name, social security number, tax
identification number). 175 This search approach likely resulted in a
significant undercounting of student-loan adversary proceedings filed in
2007.176

c. Party Name Identification
Limiting itself to the PACER Case Locator's search template, the
Luliano Study relied on a party-name search to construct its sample.' 77
The study derived the list of names from the website FinAid: The
SmartStudent Guide to Financial Aid, which includes a webpage
entitled "Largest Education Lenders (FY2007)."' 178 The first sentence of
the webpage states: "The following tables show the top 100 originators,
holders and consolidators of FederalFamily Education Loan Program
172. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-28, JUDICIARY SHOULD TAKE
FURTHER STEPS TO MAKE BANKRUPTCY DATA MORE ACCESSIBLE 20-21 (2008), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0928.pdf.
173. See, e.g., DOCKET ACTIVITY REPORT, https://ecf.mab.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktActivity

Rpt.pl (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (subscription required) (displaying search options for the U.S.
Bankruptcy

Court

for

the

District

of Massachusetts);

DOCKET

ACTIVITY

REPORT,

https://ecf.wawb.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktActivityRpt.pl
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014)
(subscription required) (displaying search options for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Washington). The Pardo-Lacey Study used this approach to construct the sample for
its research. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 202.
174. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 172, at 3 ("The U.S. Party/Case

Index was designed to allow nationwide searches of individual bankruptcy cases, and although it
serves that function, its search parameters are limited and the results do not include much of the
data held by the system.").
175. See id. at 21.
176. The Juliano Study's sample consisted of 217 adversary proceedings filed by 213
debtors. Juliano, supra note 143, at 503. According to research by the Wall Street Journal, an
NOS Code search using the "Query" page function for the individual PACER databases for each
bankruptcy court indicates that 445 individual debtors filed undue hardship adversary
proceedings nationwide in 2007. E-mail from Katherine Stech, Reporter, Wall Street Journal, to
author (Mar. 13, 2014, 08:24 p.m. EDT) (on file with author).
177. See Juliano, supra note 143, at 502.
178. See id. at 502 & n.36 (citing Largest Education Lenders (FY2007), FINAID (Apr. 14,
2008), http://www.finaid.org/loans/biglendersfy2007.phtml).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66

loans."' 179 Importantly, student loans originated under the Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP)T8 are federally guaranteed
student loans pursuant to which a private lender has provided the funds,
and they are distinct from student loans originated under the William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program pursuant to which the federal
government has provided the funds.' 8 1 Accordingly, the Iuliano Study
likely involved only student loans made under FFELP. 182 Nonetheless,
the study states that, "[c]ollectively, in 2007, these ten lenders held 71.2
percent of all student loans."' 83
By searching solely for FFELP lenders,' 84 the Iuliano Study omitted
a search for adversary proceedings involving the U.S. Department of
Education (DOE), a concern raised by the NCLC Report criticizing the
luliano Study.' 8 Importantly, 20% (23 of 115) of the adversary
proceedings in the Pardo-Lacey Study involved solely the DOE and no
other creditor. Because it did not include a search for the DOE, the
luliano Study's sample likely underrepresents the DOE's
involvement.1 86 This is quite significant given the Pardo-Lacey Study's
179. Largest Education Lenders (FY2007), FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/biglenders
fy2007.phtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (emphasis added).
180. The statutory provisions governing FFELP are set forth in Chapter 28, Subchapter IV,
Part B of Title 20 of the United States Code. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087-4 (2012). The
regulatory provisions governing FFELP student loans guaranteed by a guaranty agency are set
forth in Part 682, Subpart D of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations. See 34 C.F.R.
§§ 682.400-.423 (2012).
181. See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 9 (2012),

available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/2012report/fsa-report.pdf (summarizing
briefly the differences between FFELP and the Direct Loan Program). See generally DAVID P.
SMOLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS MADE UNDER THE FEDERAL FAMILY
EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM AND THE WILLIAM D. FORD FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM:

TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR BORROWERS (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

misc/R40122.pdf (discussing the differences between FFELP and the Direct Loan Program).
182. That program ceased originating loans in July 2010. See FED. STUDENT AID, supra
note 181, at 9.
183. luliano, supra note 143, at 502 (emphasis added).
184. It should further be noted that, once the luliano Study obtained its search results, it
selected the adversary proceedings to include in its sample by relying on the NOS Code
appearing in the proceeding's docket report. Id. at 502-03. Importantly, it is the party filing the
adversary proceeding who selects the NOS Code to which the proceeding relates. The party may
fail to select the NOS Code indicating a student-loan-dischargeability action, even though the
proceeding does involve such an action. See, e.g., Adversary Complaint Seeking: Relief on Loan
Through Discharge in Bankruptcy, Devito v. Am. Educ. Servs., Ch. 7 Case No. 11-40414, Adv.
No. 12-01851 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF No. 1; Complaint for Declaratory Relief,
Bernstein v. Sallie Mae, Inc., Ch. 7 Case No. 10-19772, Adv. No. 11-01545 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 1. A better approach is to read the plaintiff's complaint commencing
the adversary proceeding to ascertain whether it involves a student-loan-dischargeability action.
185. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 4.

186. There is the possibility that, given the mix of student loans owed by the debtor, some
of the adversary proceedings in the Iuliano Study could have involved the DOE. See, e.g., Pardo
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finding that the amount of debt discharged was negatively correlated
with the involvement of the DOE as a party in the adversary
187 Once again, this points to the likelihood of
proceeding.
sample bias in
1 88
the luliano Study.
2. Poor Coding Protocols for Relief
The second reason to question the Iuliano Study's conclusions is that
they rest on potentially inaccurate coding protocols for relief.
Specifically, the studyo coded dismissal of an adversary proceeding as
not involving relief,1 9 including dismissals where the debtor sought
non-bankruptcy administrative relief. 190 On the other hand, the study
coded a default judgment entered against a creditor as involving
relief.191 These coding protocols, however, are not sufficiently finegrained. Debtors sometimes seek a voluntary dismissal of their
adversary proceedings to pursue a non-bankruptcy discharge granted by
the DOE,1 92 such as a discharge based on the debtor's total and
permanent disability due to a medical condition.1 93 The study's
assertions that "someone whose case was dismissed received just as
little relief as a person who lost at trial"' 94 and that administrative
remedies "are poor substitutes for bankruptcy discharges"'1 95 are just not
true in every instance.
Furthermore, strong reasons exist to doubt the Iuliano Study's
assertions that "a default judgment provides the same amount of relief
as a trial victory" 196 and that such a judgment "is even better for debtors
197
because they do not have to spend time litigating the dispute."
Debtors will sometimes name as the defendant the servicer of the
student loan or a previous holder of the student loan (who subsequently
& Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 209 n. 128 ("Six of the 115 adversary
proceedings involved both the Education Department and ECMC.").
187. Id. at 219-20, 222 tbl.6.
188. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 4 ("Including DOE surely would
have provided a more robust and representative dataset.").
189. See luliano, supra note 143, at 499-500.
190. See id. at 506.
191. See id. at 499-500, 512.
192. See, e.g., Joint Stipulation for Dismissal of This Proceeding Without Prejudice, Ruiz
v. Chase (In re Ruiz), Ch. 7 Case No. 12-40600, Adv. No. 12-04031 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 12,
2012), ECF No. 13.
193. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(1) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 6 8 2 .402(c) (2012). For an example of
such a voluntary dismissal, see Assented to Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Eafrati v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Eafrati), Ch. 13 Case No. 11-10784, Adv. No. 12-01021 (Bankr.
D.N.H. Sept. 23, 2013), ECF No. 27.
194. luliano, supra note 143, at 500.
195. Id. at 506.
196. Id. at 500.
197. Id.
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assigned the loan to a third party prior to the commencement of the
adversary proceeding), while failing to name the current lender (and, if
applicable, the guarantor) of the loan.' 98 Under these circumstances, a
default judgment granted against the servicer or a prior holder will not
provide any substantive relief to the debtor insofar as the debtor does
not owe a debt to either party. 199 Accordingly, depending on the
circumstances, it may have been inappropriate for the luliano Study to.
code adversary proceedings resolved by default judgments as
proceedings involving relief for the debtor.
3. Misconceptions of the Legal Landscape
The third reason to question the luliano Study's conclusions is that
some of its assertions evince misconceptions of the legal landscape.
Here, this Article offers four examples: (1) the inaccurate description of
ECMC and its role in the system, (2) the discussion of administrative
remedies, (3) the use of the poverty guidelines, and (4) the discussion of
the undue hardship doctrine.
First, the luliano Study characterized ECMC as "the nation 's largest
guarantor of educational loans" and further noted that, "[i]n many
proceedings, only Educational Credit Management Corporation, and not
the actual debt holder, appeared on the docket." 20 Both of these
statements are likely inaccurate. First, during the 2008 fiscal year,
ECMC was the seventh-largest guarantor of federal student loans, with
a market share of 3.9%. 2° 1 Second, when not acting as a FFELP
198. See, e.g., Motion by Educational Credit Management Corporation to Intervene and/or
Be Joined as a Party Defendant at 1-2, 2 n.2, Griggs v. Access Grp. Loan Servicing (In re
Griggs), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-09227, Adv. No. 12-00285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2012), ECF
No. 25; Sallie Mae, Inc.'s Objection to Motion for Default Judgment and Request to Dismiss
17-18, Johnson v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Johnson), Ch.
Sallie Mae, Inc. as a Party Defendant
7 Case No. 11-23108, Adv. No. 11-06250 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 6,2012), ECF No. 15.
199. See, e.g., Lepre v. Dep't of Educ. (In re Lepre), 466 B.R. 727, 729-30 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2012); Srinivasan v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Srinivasan), Ch. 7 Case No. 10-12732(RTL),
Adv. No. 10-1545(RTL), 2010 WL 3633062, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2010); Lyso v.
Student Loan Fin. Corp., Ch. 7 Case No. 07-40653, Adv. No. 08-4014, 2008 WL 2513818, at *1
(Bankr. D.S.D. June 20, 2008). A default judgment against an originally named defendant will
provide substantive relief if the defendant held the loan at the time that the debtor commenced
the adversary proceeding but thereafter assigned the loan to a third party whom the debtor did
not name as a defendant. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Bernal (In re Bemal), 207 F.3d
595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000); Wedell v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Wedell), 329 B.R. 59, 61 (W.D.
Wash. 2005); Garmhausen v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Garmhausen), 262 B.R. 217,
222 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001). If, however, the assignee had an independent claim against the
debtor, such as a guarantee claim, the default judgment against the assignor would not affect the
guarantee claim. See, e.g., In re Wedell, 329 B.R. at 61-62; In re Garmhausen, 262 B.R. at 2223.
200. luliano, supra note 143, at 502 & n.39 (emphasis added).
201. Who's Up/Who's Down: Changes in GuarantorFederal Student Loan Commitments
for FY08 (Updated), STUDENT LENDING ANALYTICS BLOG (Mar.

16, 2009, 11:43 AM),

http://studentlendinganalytics.typepad.com/student-lending-analytics/2009/03/whos-upwhos-do
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guarantor, 202 ECMC "defends student loans in bankruptcy cases for the
federal government and other guaranty agencies.' 20 3 As a result of this
process, ECMC purportedly becomes the holder of the debt,20 4 contrary
to the study's assertion.
Second, in describing administrative remedies available to studentloan debtors, the Juliano Study stated: "Whereas bankruptcy relief is
immediate, administrative remedies require debtors to make payments
on their loans for twenty-five years before receiving a discharge, and
even after that time is up, the discharged debt is treated as taxable
income. '20 5 While it is true that certain administrative remedies involve
income-based repayment plans over a certain period of time, not all
involve twenty-five-year repayment periods,2 and not all involve
cancellation of indebtedness. 207 Moreover, some administrative
remedies involve an immediate discharge of the debtor's student
loan.20 8 Finally, for those repayment plans involving cancellation of
indebtedness, the cancelled debt is not always treated as taxable
*
209
income.
Third, to calculate the percentage of discharge seekers who lived
below the poverty line, the Juliano Study relied on the poverty
guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) in 2007. In doing so, the study did not account for the
wn-guarantor-market-share-changes-for-fy08.html; see also Who Are the Ten Largest Student
Loan Guarantors?, STUDENT LENDING ANALYTICS BLOG (Sept. 23, 2008, 11:32 PM),
http://www.studentlendinganalytics.typepad.com/student-lending-analytics/2008/09/who-are-th
e-ten-largest-student-loan-guarantors.html (providing statistics indicating that ECMC was not
the nation's largest guarantor of educational loans either during the first three quarters of the
2007 fiscal year or during the first three quarters of the 2008 fiscal year).
202. See infra Section III.A.
203. Archibald v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Archibald), 280 B.R. 222, 226
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2002).
204. See, e.g., Alfes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Alfes), 709 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir.
2013).
205. luliano, supra note 143, at 506.
206. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 682.209(a)(6)(viii)(E), (a)(7)(i) (2013) (providing that, for
certain FFELP loans paid under an income-sensitive repayment schedule, "a lender shall allow a
borrower at least 5 years, but not more than 10 years" to repay the loan), with id.
§ 685.209(b)(3)(iii)(A) (stating that the "maximum repayment period under the [income
contingent repayment] plan" for Direct loans "is 25 years").
207. See id. § 682.209(a)(6)(viii)(E), (a)(7)(i) (providing that, for certain FFELP loans paid
under an income-sensitive repayment schedule, "a lender shall allow a borrower at least 5 years,
but not more than 10 years" to repay the loan).
208. See, e.g., id.§ 682.402(c)(9)(x), (xii)(A)-(B) (providing for total-and-permanentdisability discharge for FFELP loans owed by veterans); id. § 682.402(d)(2)(i) (providing for
closed-school discharge for FFELP loans); id.§ 685.214(b)(1) (providing for closed-school
discharge for Direct loans).
209. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), (f)(1) (2012).
210. See Iuliano, supranote 143, at 511 & n.65.
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fact that the "HHS poverty guidelines for any given calendar year
approximate the Census Bureau poverty thresholds from the previous
calendar year.'211 Because the luliano Study derived its income data
from bankruptcy cases filed in 2007,212 and because it also presumably
used the 2007 monthly income data to calculate the percentage of
discharge seekers who lived below the poverty line, 213 the study should
have relied on the HHS poverty guidelines from 2008.
Finally, the luliano Study made unsubstantiated, patently incorrect
assertions regarding the undue hardship doctrine. In jurisdictions that
have adopted the Brunner test for undue hardship, a debtor must
establish that he "has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. 2 1 4 The
215
but then
this requirement,
identified
correctly
luliano
assertions:
the following
to make
proceededStudy
[T]he good faith effort prong requires courts to look at the
debtor's past actions. Current employment status is
irrelevantas to whether the debtor made a good faith effort
to repay student loans in the past. Finally, given
employment's close association with financial well-being,
employment is more indicative of a debtor's current and
to repay than of a debtor's good faith effort
future inability
2 16
to repay.
The Iuliano Study did not cite to any source, let alone any judicial
opinions, in support of these propositions.
Judicial opinions interpreting the undue hardship standard, however,
clearly establish that a debtor's actions subsequent to the
commencement of the adversary proceeding are relevant in applying the
good-faith prong of the Brunnertest.217 Moreover, courts have indicated
that a debtor's employment status is a relevant factor when conducting
the good-faith analysis. For example, in its decision adopting the
Brunner test, the Seventh Circuit stated: "With the receipt of a
government-guaranteed education, the student assumes an obligation to
211. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 206 n.122 (citing
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 3147, 3147 (Jan. 24, 2007)).

212. See Iuliano, supra note 143, at 502, 510.
213. Id.at 510-11, 511 nn.65-67.
214. E.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987) (per curiam)). Every federal regional circuit--except for the First, Eighth, and District of
Columbia Circuits-has adopted the Brunner test. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text.
215. See luliano, supra note 143, at 516.
216. Id at 517 (emphasis added).
217. See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R.
490, 500 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002); Burton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Burton), 339 B.R.
856, 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
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make a good faith effort to repay those loans, as measuredby his or her
efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize
expenses." 218 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "'[g]oodfaith
is measured by the debtor's efforts to obtain employment, maximize
income, and minimize expenses. ' ' 21 9 It goes without saying that a
debtor who actually is employed has made an effort to gain employment
(i.e., the employment is an observable effect of that effort).
These examples highlight how the luliano Study's description of the
system that it sought to empirically study was, at times, flawed. The
absence of an accurate descriptive account of these core system features
calls into question whether the luliano Study had the proper lens to
carefully and critically analyze the primary materials it reviewed to
gather the data upon which its findings are based.22°
4. The Disconnect Between the Juliano Study's Conclusion and
Reality
On the basis of a shaky sample, the luliano Study observed that
"courts grant discharges to nearly forty percent of discharge seekers"
and further stated that the study's data "also showed that courts are not
granting relief in an indiscriminate manner.",22' These findings
prompted the Juliano Study to criticize the bankruptcy community for
"condemn[ing] the undue hardship requirement., 222 These statements
further exemplify sweeping claims that fail to properly grasp the bigger
picture. In the luliano Study's sample, approximately 19.5% (40 of 205)
of the proceedings resulted in a trial verdict. 223 In other words,
approximately 80.5% of the adversary proceedings did not involve a
judicial determination regarding undue hardship.224-Courts are not likely
218. In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
219. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added) (quoting In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at 499).
220. Cf.Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The EmpiricalRevolution in Law, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2013) ("[E]mpiricism cannot be divorced from substance. The design
of credible empirical work must be informed by substantive, institutionalknowledge.").
221. luliano, supranote 143, at 525 (emphasis added).
222. Id.

223. Id. at 500 n.30. It is unclear why luliano sets forth only 205 procedural outcomes, see
id., when his dataset consisted of 207 observations, see id. at 503.
224. It could be that, for the four adversary proceedings in the luliano Study that resulted in
summary judgment, see id. at 500 n.30, the disposition was one involving an undue hardship
determination. The luliano Study, however, does not specify the basis for each summary
judgment disposition or the party that prevailed. Importantly, a summary judgment motion
might dispose of discrete issues rather than the entire matter before the court. See RICHARD D.
FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.4, at 473-74 (3d ed. 2012). But even if the luliano Study's

summary judgment dispositions involved an undue hardship determination, only 21.5% (44 of
205) of the proceedings would have resulted in a judicial determination regarding undue
hardship. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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to apply the undue hardship standard to the facts of the debtor's claim
when there is a default judgment, and they do not apply the standard
when there is a settlement or when there is a voluntary dismissal (or
even, in some instances, when there is an involuntary dismissal,
depending on the basis of the dismissal). In light of these
considerations, the Iuliano Study overclaims what its data show.
Moreover, the forty trial verdicts in the luliano Study's sample do
not reveal much about the consistency of judicial application of the
undue hardship standard.225 Prior research indicates "that local legal
culture exercises a pervasive, systematic influence on the operation of
the federal bankruptcy system in ways unanticipated by lawmakers or
academic researchers. "22The Iuliano Study's sample was far too small
to show whether courts within individual judicial districts have
consistently applied the undue hardship standard. With forty trial
verdicts, the Iuliano Study's sample, in essence, has less than one
judicial determination of undue hardship per federal judicial district (of
which there are ninety-one in the fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico).2 27 Thus, the luliano Study overclaimed in stating that
its data demonstrated consistent application of the undue hardship
standard by courts. Its data cannot shed light, one way or another, on the
validity of this claim.
Nonetheless, the luliano Study proceeded to argue that more debtors
should initiate adversary proceedings to determine the dischargeability
of their student loans. In doing so, the study ruminated that "it seems
that bankruptcy filers' lack of accurate knowledge of the system is the
main problem., 229 The study based this claim on its observations that
"the cost of pursuing a student loan discharge is relatively low
compared to the cost of filing bankruptcy '2 30 and that "there is no
statistically significant difference in outcomes between debtors without
attorneys and debtors with attorneys., 231 But, as the NCLC Report
noted, the study's conclusions "are not supported by the empirical data

225. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
226. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 806 (1994).

227. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (2012). Moreover, many of those judicial districts have
multi-judge bankruptcy courts. See id. § 152(a)(2). Importantly, the Pardo-Lacey Study found
that the identity of the judge assigned to the debtor's adversary proceeding was statistically
significantly associated with the percentage of debt discharged. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real
Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 234.

228.
229.
230.
231.

luliano, supra note 143, at 501, 525.
Id.at 501.
Id.
Id.
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232
and ignore the plain realities facing student loan borrowers."
Consider the faults with the Luliano Study's observations. In a recent
adversary proceeding from 2012, an attorney charged his client a fixed
fee of $2,500, which "included all legal services necessary to prepare
and file the complaint and to represent the Debtor through mediation or
settlement of the adversary proceeding, whichever came first., 2 33 The
attorney spent a total of nine to thirteen hours working on such
matters, 234 which equated to an hourly fee ranging from $192 to $277.
Moreover, the fixed fee of $2,500 exceeded the $2,000 fee that the
23 Finally, the
attorney charged the debtor for filing her Chapter 7 case. 23
settlement involved voluntary dismissal of the adversary proceeding so
the debtor could pursue an administrative remedy-an income-based
repayment plan 236-that presumably was available to her prior to filing
the adversary proceeding. This anecdote exemplifies the extent to which
the luliano Study's cost observation is ungrounded.
The NCLC Report correctly states that a student-loan adversary
proceeding "is subject to the civil procedural rules dealing with the
filing of a complaint and service of process, pre-trial discovery, motion
practice, and evidentiary requirements, 237 and it accurately observes
that "ECMC and other student loan creditors.., will conduct a
deposition of the debtor, require responses to formal discovery requests,
and challenge the debtor if expert testimony is not provided., 238 Given
the complexity of such proceedings, the NCLC Report concludes the
following regarding the litigation costs involved in student-loan
discharge proceedings:

Given the highly aggressive litigation tactics of ECMC and
other creditors . . . most hardship discharge cases require
substantial time to properly litigate, ranging anywhere from
40 to 100 hours, or more. If attorneys charge for this time
even at a discounted hourly rate, fees can easily
23 mount in
the thousands and tens of thousands of dollars. 9
232. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 1.
233. Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor/Plaintiff at 2, Madson v. U.S.
Dep't of Educ. (In re Madson), Ch. 7 Case No. 12-25607, Adv. No. 12-02008 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
Feb. 4, 2012), ECF No. 12.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Order Approving Stipulation for Settlement of Student Loan Debt and Dismissal of
Adversary Proceeding Without Prejudice at 1-2, Madson, Case No. 12-25607, Adv. No. 1202008, ECF No. 15.
237. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 3.

238. Id. For an example of an adversary proceeding in which ECMC scheduled a
deposition of the debtor, see Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum at 1-2, Griggs v.
Access Grp. Loan Servicing (In re Griggs), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-09227, Adv. No. 12-00285
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2013), ECF No. 31.
239. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 3.
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If one assumes an hourly rate of $100, which is much less than the
real-life example provided above,24 0 a debtor would have to pay an
attorney $4,000 to $10,000 to properly litigate a student-loan adversary
proceeding, if not more. 24 1 And herein lies one of the access-to-justice
barriers: "Those debtors who are in the most dire need of relief-that is,
those for whom repayment will certainly impose an undue hardshipwill likely lack the resources to pursue such relief in the first
instance."
In fact, there is evidence that many attorneys may be
disinclined to take on such cases. 24 3 When one considers "that
contingent-fee arrangements do not exist between attorneys and debtors
in undue hardship discharge proceedings since a discharge does not
generate a monetary award but rather a release from personal
liability, '244 and that such debtors are unlikely to have sufficient sums
of money to pay for more than a minimal amount of services, 245 the lack
of economic
incentives to take on such representation becomes readily
246
apparent.

Alternatively, "[flor those debtors who have the resources required
to litigate a claim of undue hardship, their claim ironically becomes less
sympathetic insofar as the creditor may be able to point to such
resources as a potential source of repayment. 2 47 Such debtors face the
risk of losing at trial and thus incurring "substantial litigation

240. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
241. See, e.g., Katy Stech, 5 Things Student Loan Lawyers Ask Borrowers Who File for
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/01/06/5things-student-loan-lawyers-ask-borrowers-who-file-for-bankruptcy/
(reporting that studentloan debtor's attorney "didn't charge the [debtor] for the $25,000 worth of legal work on the
case").
242. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 191.
243. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, STUDENT LOAN DEBT CRISIS
SURVEY (2012), available at http://www.nacba.org/Legislative/StudentLoanDebt.aspx (follow
"Read the February 7, 2012 NACBA member survey results here." hyperlink) ("Most
bankruptcy attorneys (95 percent) report that few student loan debtors are seen as having any
chance of obtaining a discharge as a result of undue hardship."); Lieber, supra note 8 ("Mr.
Stanton did not see it that way. 'It's the last one [i.e., undue hardship adversary proceeding] I've
ever done, because I was just so horrified,' he said. 'I didn't even have the client pay me. In all
of the cases in 30 years of bankruptcy work, I came away with about the worst taste in my
mouth that I've ever had."' (quoting Steven Stanton, a bankruptcy lawyer in Granite City,
Illinois)).
244. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 211.
245. Seeid.at2ll-12,211n.137.
246. Cf Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American MedicalLiability
System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 194 (2014) ("High litigation costs make accepting many
legitimate cases economically infeasible for contingent fee attorneys. Unless expected damages
are large, the attorneys simply cannot justify accepting many cases because the expected fees
will not offset the high costs of medical malpractice litigation.").
247. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 2, at 191-92.
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expenses" 248 without any attendant benefit. Worse yet, depending on the
terms of the student-loan promissory note, the debtor's litigation
expenses might even include the attorney's fees incurred by the creditor
during the adversary proceeding. 249 Finally, this group of debtors might
encounter yet another access-to-justice barrier: "excessive search costs
that prevent [such] student-loan debtors from finding the highly
who will provide better chances of obtaining
experienced attorneys
250
extensive relief.,
Given that the economics of undue hardship litigation are likely to
dissuade most attorneys from representing debtors in such proceedings,
concerns arise that the choice of counsel for debtors will be quite
limited and perhaps confined mostly to low-quality attorneys. Examples
here include an attorney who filed a blank shipping order as the
complaint initiating the adversary proceeding on his client's behalf,25 ,
as well as an attorney who was "barred from appearing on behalf of any
client in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nebraska, including the filing of further bankruptcy cases or filing any
documents or pleadings in existing bankruptcy cases" due to the
attorney's repeated failures to comply with the court's order demanding
his appearance. 252 And, for a more extreme example, consider the
attorney who pleaded guilty to a federal charge of illegally possessing
cud not
ntcniucontinue
an unregistered machine gun, 253 and thus could

248. 1 NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 3, at 212.
249. See, e.g., Busson-Sokolik v. Milwaukee Sch. of Eng'g (In re Busson-Sokolik), 635
F.3d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 2011).
250. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 233.
251. See Complaint, Reslink v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Reslink), Ch. 7 Case No.
11-12041, Adv. No. 12-01075 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 1. The court, sua
sponte, dismissed the "complaint" without prejudice. See Order, Reslink, Ch. 7 Case No. 1112041, Adv. No. 12-01075 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 3, 2012), ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Dismissal
Order, Reslink v. ECMC]. Lest the reader think that this was an isolated instance of ineffective
assistance in this adversary proceeding, the docket in Reslink is rife with corrective entries by
the clerk's office indicating the failure of debtor's counsel to comply with various procedural
requirements. See, e.g., Docket, Reslink, Ch. 7 Case No. 11-12041, Adv. No. 12-01075 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. opened June 28, 2012), ECF Nos. 9, 11, 13, 20, 31, 32. Moreover, the failure of
debtor's counsel to comply with a court order prompted the court to issue an order against him
"to show cause as to why the Adversary Proceeding should not be dismissed with prejudice
and/or other sanctions imposed, including a monetary fine imposed against him, in addition to
other possible sanctions." Order to Show Cause at 1-2, Reslink, Ch. 7 Case No. 11-12041, Adv.
No. 12-01075 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2013), ECF No. 66.
252. Grimm v. United States (In re Grimm), Ch.7 Case No. 10-42511, Adv. No. 11-04016,
slip op.at 2 (Bankr. D.Neb. Dec. 12, 2012), ECF No. 40.
253. Gary Ridley, Owosso Attorney Pleads Guilty in Flint Federal Court to Machine Gun
Charge, MLIvE (Dec. 18, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/
2012/12/owosso-area attomey_pleadsgu.html.
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representing his client in her student-loan adversary proceeding. 254
The luliano Study's response to all of this would apparently be that
debtors should represent themselves when seeking a bankruptcy
discharge of their student loans: "Rather than condemn the undue
hardship requirement, members of the bankruptcy community should
encourage debtors with legitimate need to file adversary proceedings
even if they cannot hire an attorney." 255 The NCLC Report took issue
with this recommendation, stating that "[i]t is absurd to suggest that
many debtors without representation could properly litigate a hardship
case and avoid dismissal '2 56 and that "[m]ost pro se debtors do not
know what proof is required [to establish 2undue
hardship] or how to
57
present it in court under the evidence rules.,
The dockets of student-loan adversary proceedings include voluntary
dismissals where self-represented debtors have explained to the
bankruptcy court their inability to litigate their claims of undue hardship
without the assistance of counsel.2 5 For self-represented debtors, the
reality is that their lives become severely disrupted and consumed by
the daunting task of navigating a highly technical and complex legal
process.259 Despite these realities, the luliano Study made the following
254. See Docket, Schmidt v. Sallie Mae (In re Schmidt), Ch. 7 Case No. 12-31821, Adv.
No. 12-03280 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. opened Aug. 3, 2012) (indicating that debtor's attorney was
suspended).
255. luliano, supra note 143, at 525.
256. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 3.

257. Id.
258. For example, one self-represented debtor stated:
Honorable Court I would like to communicate to you ahead of time for my non
attendance [sic] on November 6th, hearing I am new to the Bankruptcy
procedures and find it quite complicated, I am uneducated on my rights and I
feel extremely intimidated by the two defendants, do [sic] to their years of
experience in the Bankruptcy laws.
Declaration of Voluntary Dismissal of Chapter 7, Adversary Hearing at 1, Reveles v. Sallie
Mae, Ch. 7 Case No. 12-34871, Adv. No. 12-02033 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012), ECF No.
16. Another self-represented debtor stated:
It is clear to me that I did not understandthe complexity offiling an Adversary
Complaint to dischargemy student loans when doing so. I understood from my
research that discharging these loans is difficult and almost never occurs, but I
did not foresee that the process would be infinitely more complicated than the
filing of the bankruptcy itself. The documents that have been addressed to me
concerning this matter are overwhelming.
Letter/Motion to Withdraw Complaint Filed by Plaintiff/Debtor, Henry v. Wells Fargo Bank NA
(In re Henry), Ch. 7 Case No. 12-71257, Adv. No. 12-07044 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2012),
ECF No. 32 (emphasis added).
259. See Sperazza v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sperazza), 366 B.R. 397, 405
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) ("[Blecause of the fact that I had no choice but to prepare and litigate my
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26 °
definitive claim, based on a statistically nonsignificantfinding:

The second misconception is that lawyers are necessary.
Surprisingly, they are not. In fact, in my sample, pro se
debtors were actually more likely to receive discharges than
their counterparts who were represented by counsel (43%
vs. 38%). This is not to say that attorneys add no value in
these cases. Instead, it proves that
261hiring an attorney is not

a prerequisiteto obtaining relief

The NCLC Report expressed strong doubts about this claim,262 a
position that is valid for the following reasons: First, the Juliano Study's
observation fails to recognize that skill and competence vary among
attorneys and that differences in lawyer quality might create statistical
noise when grouping all lawyers together for purposes of comparing
outcomes between represented and self-represented debtors. Second, the
observation ignores statistically significant findings to this effect. While
the Pardo-Lacey Study did not find a statistically significant association
between the percentage of debt discharged and the represented status of
debtors (i.e., represented by an attorney or self-represented),263 it did
find that the percentage of debt discharged was statistically significantly
greater for the group of debtors represented by a "highly experienced"
attorney than for the group of debtors who were not represented by such
an attorney (i.e., debtors who were represented by a "lesserexperienced" attorney or who were self-represented).264 The correlation
persisted even when controlling for a variety of factors, including
doctrinally relevant facts and the identity of the judge assigned to the
adversary proceeding. 265 Thus, while not all representation will
contribute to successful outcomes, 266 high-quality representation should
make a difference.
own adversary proceeding, which I have stated several times during this proceeding, I also had
no choice but to temporarily suspend my job seeking activities-mainly the applying for
specific jobs." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
260. luliano, supra note 143, at 501 & n.34.
261. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
262. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, at 2 ("The luliano study irresponsibly
suggests that debtors do 'not need to hire an attorney to be successful' in hardship discharge
cases." (emphasis added)).
263. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 222 tbl.6.

264. See id. at 220, 222 tbl.6. The Pardo-Lacey Study operationalized an attorney's level
of experience based on the number of years of experience of the debtor's counsel as of the date
of the filing of the adversary proceeding. See id.
at 218 n. 150.
265. See id. at 227, 228 tbl.9.
266. Consider, for example, the Pardo-Lacey Study's finding that representation by a
particular attorney was statistically significantly associated with both the discharge of a lower
percentage of student-loan debt and the resolution of such proceedings by trial. See id.at 22021, 222 tbl.6, 223 tbl.7.
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At the end of the day, readers of the luliano Study should reject its
assertions-whether express or implied-that access-to-justice barriers
are not a concern in undue hardship litigation. Such barriers do exist,
and they ratchet up the difficulty faced by debtors in establishing the
merits of their claims for relief. To make matters worse, some
institutional creditors repeatedly force debtors to contend with
procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation. This sort of litigation
behavior prejudicially distorts, to the detriment of debtors, the form in
which courts consider undue hardship claims. This Article now turns to
an explanation and illustration of this dynamic.
III. A CAUTIONARY TALE OF MISTAKES AND MISBEHAVIOR IN UNDUE
HARDSHIP LITIGATION

When The New York Times recently asked ECMC to comment on
critiques of ECMC's litigation behavior in undue hardship adversary
proceedings, the company "issued a statement saying that its practices
strictly follow federal law."'267 Furthermore, while a DOE spokesman
indicated "that the department... believes that [ECMC] complies with
the law and government policies," he also noted that the DOE would be
willing to investigate ECMC if evidence of its misbehavior came to
light. For the reasons that follow, it may be worthwhile for the DOE
and question the role that ECMC plays in undue hardship
to reexamine
269
litigation.
This Part challenges these assertions regarding the propriety of
ECMC's compliance with the law. Section nI.A provides an account of
ECMC's operations in undue hardship litigation. Using original
empirical research that investigated the dockets of undue hardship
adversary proceedings from 2011 and 2012 involving ECMC, Section
III.B provides examples of how ECMC has failed to comply with
certain procedural requirements in litigating against student-loan
debtors. Section III.C then discusses in detail an example of pollutive
267. Kitroeff, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
268. Id.
269. In a similar vein, some members of Congress have called upon the DOE to establish
guidelines for its contractors-including ECMC--that identify when it is appropriate to contest a
debtor's request for relief in an undue hardship adversary proceeding. Press Release, Congressman
Steve Cohen, Cohen, 6 Members of Congress Urge Education Secretary to Bring More Fairness to
Struggling Students (May 16, 2014), available at http://cohen.house.gov/press-release/cohen-6members-congress-urge-education-secretary-bring-more-faimess-struggling (stating that "the path
to an undue hardship discharge is often blocked by Department contractors, such as the
Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC), which have a practice of aggressively
challenging debtors' efforts to show undue hardship" and also that it is not "sensible or costeffective for the Department or its contractors to engage in lengthy legal challenges and appeals
against bankruptcy student loan borrowers who have demonstrated a clear and legitimate
inability to repay their loans" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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litigation by ECMC-the frivolous argument that the doctrine of claim
preclusion prevents a Chapter 7 debtor from initiating an undue
hardship adversary proceeding after having been granted a discharge in
her underlying bankruptcy case.
A. A Thumbnail Sketch of ECMC
Founded in 1994 as Transitional Guaranty Agency, Inc., 270 and
2711
renamed Educational Credit Management Corporation in 1996,
ECMC was created to facilitate the takeover of failing guaranty
agencies as well as to provide other services to the DOE.2 2 Since
ECMC as the
ECMC's founding in 1994, the DOE has desinated
73
guaranty agency in four states: Virginia in 1996, Oregon in 2005,274
and California and Connecticut in 20 10.275
In addition to serving as a designated guarantor for FFELP loans,
pursuant to its agreement with the DOE, ECMC is "authorized to accept
assignment of all FFELP loans on which the borrower has filed a
petition for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. ' ,2 76 The agreement
further states that "ECMC may accept assignment of a loan in any stage
270. Letter from Helen Lew, Acting Assistant Inspector Gen. for Audit Servs., U.S. Dep't
of Educ., to Theresa S. Shaw, Chief Operating Officer, Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
and Sally Stroup, Assistant Sec'y, Office of Postsecondary Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ. at 2 &
n.2 (Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Lew Letter], availableat http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
oig/auditreports/a05d0001 .pdf.
271. Id. But see McAlpin v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re McAlpin), 254 B.R. 449,451
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (stating that ECMC's name change occurred in May 1995), rev'd, 263
B.R. 881 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 278 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2002).
272. Lew Letter, supra note 270, at 2; see also Letter from Gary D. Whitman, Reg'l
Inspector Gen. for Audit Servs., U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Richard Boyle, Chief Exec. Officer,
ECMC Grp. Inc., at 21 (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Whitman Letter], available at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/listoig/auditreports/fy2Oll/aO5kOOO1.pdf (setting forth the
2006 agreement between ECMC and the DOE and providing that "[t]he Department may ask
ECMC to assist or assume the responsibilities for an insolvent or otherwise failing guarantor").
273. Lew Letter, supra note 270, at 2.
274. Whitman Letter, supra note 272, at 16. But see Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.,
730 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1288 (D. Or. 2010) (stating that the DOE designated ECMC as the
guaranty agency for Oregon in 2004).
275. See Press Release, Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., CSLF Transitions Its Student Loan
at
(Nov.
2,
2009),
available
Portfolio
to
ECMC
Guarantee
http://www.ecmc.org/idc/native/cslfannouncement.pdf; Press Release, Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp., ECMC Assumes Responsibility for Loans Guaranteed by California Agency (Nov. 1,
2010), availableat http://www.ecmc.org/idc/native/ecmcnewsreleasel 101 10-ca.pdf.
276. Whitman Letter, supra note 272, at 19; see also, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae
Educational Credit Management Corp. in Support of Petitioner at 3, United Student Aid Funds,
Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010) (No. 08-1134), 2009 WL 2896305, at *3 ("For
example, when a borrower files a chapter 13 bankruptcy, the lender receives general notice of
filing from the bankruptcy clerk; the lender then files a claim for the student loan with the
guaranty agency, who then, in the majority of cases, assigns the account to ECMC for
handling.").
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of the bankruptcy process and from any guaranty agency or the
Department." 2" Given this Article's focus on ECMC's procedural
noncompliance and pollutive litigation, it is especially worth noting that
the DOE has emphasized in its agreement with ECMC the reason why it
has chosen ECMC to represent the federal interest in bankruptcy
litigation involving FFELP loans:
The Department acknowledges that, over the past 10 years
in performing its bankruptcy servicing role..., ECMC has
developed unique legal expertise and capabilities in
defending and promoting the interests of the FFEL Program
on a national basis. Subject to applicable law and
regulations, ECMC is authorized to continue to take all
appropriate action to defend and promote the interests of
the FFEL Program on a national basis, including without
limitation helping develop a more uniform interpretation
and enforcement of the student loan provisions within the
laws
U.S. Bankruptcy Code and other applicable
27
throughout all jurisdictions in the United States. 8
As Sections III.B and III.C will discuss, various indicators suggest
that one can characterize some of ECMC's litigation conduct as
procedurally noncompliant and pollutive. This should prompt the DOE
to reassess whether ECMC is an appropriate representative of the
federal interest in undue hardship adversary proceedings-particularly
if ECMC's noncompliance contravenes the DOE's mandate that ECMC
adhere "to applicable law and regulations. 2 79 But before turning to
examples of ECMC's litigation conduct, this Article will briefly discuss
the scope of ECMC's involvement in the bankruptcy forum and the
resources available to it in carrying out its bankruptcy-servicing role.
From 2008 through 2012, the bankruptcy student-loan portfolio
serviced by ECMC has grown in size. At the end of each calendar year,
its portfolio had loans with an outstanding balance of approximately
$1.45 billion in 2008,80 $1.8 billion in 2009281 $2.3 billion in 2010,2
277. Whitman Letter, supra note 272, at 19.
278. Id. at 20.
279. Id. In a similar vein, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has recently called
upon the DOE to improve its monitoring of collection agencies to ensure that they comply with
federal law when interacting with student-loan borrowers. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-14-256, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS:
&
REHABILITATION
22
DEFAULTED
LOAN

BETIER OVERSIGHT COULD IMPROVE
available at
n.31,
25
(2014),

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661437.pdf.
280. Whitman Letter, supra note 272, at 2.
281. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Tax
Income (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2009) (on file with author).
282. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Tax
Income (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010) (on file with author).
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$2.8 billion in 2011,283 and $2.9 billion in 2012.284 These figures clearly
illustrate that a significant number of student-loan debtors in bankruptcy
must contend with ECMC.
Evidence suggests that, annually, the federal government makes
available to ECMC large amounts of money for ECMC to carry out its
bankruptcy-servicing role. That money is located in a Federal Reserve
Fund that is maintained by the Federal Services Bureau (the FSB
Fund). 285 The DOE has authorized ECMC to use the FSB Fund to
"handle[] all functions or assignments carried out by ECMC at the
request of the Department; 286 and the DOE has identified the servicing
and monitoring of FFELP loans subject to bankruptcy proceedings as
the FSB's primary function.287 The following description of the
operation of the FSB Fund demonstrates ECMC's access to significant
resources when litigating against student-loan debtors:
All of the FSB's funds are the property of the Department,
and the Agreement requires ECMC to return to the
Department 100 percent of the FSB Federal Reserve Fund
balance each year. However, the Department, at its sole
discretion, may require less than 100 percent transfer of the
Federal Reserve Fund balance. The Department did not
require ECMC to return any of the $252 million balance
that existed in the FSB Federal Reserve Fund as of
September 30, 2008. However, in a memorandum to
ECMC dated February 5, 2010, the Department required
ECMC to return $438 million of the $538 million balance
that existed in the FSB Federal Reserve Fund as of
September 30, 2009.288
This financing arrangement highlights how the resource asymmetries
inherent in undue hardship litigation skew heavily in favor of ECMC.
While ECMC has been able to pay some of its local counsel at hourly
rates of approximately $205,289 $270,290 and $275,291 the overwhelming
283. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Tax
Income (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011) (on file with author).
284. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Tax
Income (OMB No. 1545-0047) sched. 0, pt. III, 1.4d (2012) (on file with author).
285. Whitman Letter, supra note 272, at 2.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See Affidavit of Gwen P. Weisberg, Exhibit 2, August v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency (In re August), Ch. 7 Case No. 05-34060, Adv. No. 05-03158 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr.
21, 2006), ECF No. 37-2.
290. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel from Plaintiff Further Responses to
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and Request for an Order Directing
Plaintiff to Pay ECMC's Legal Expenses in the Amount of $3,226.50, 10, at 10, Graber v.
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majority of student-loan debtors do not likely have the financial
wherewithal to hire such attorneys.292 Given the significant amount of
resources available to it, ECMC is well poised to wage a war of attrition
against student-loan debtors.293
B. An EmpiricalInvestigation of ECMC's Procedural
Noncompliance
This Section presents the results of original empirical research that
attempts to uncover patterns of procedural noncompliance by ECMC in
undue hardship litigation. First, this Section summarizes the study
design. Next, it provides descriptive statistics relating to four categories
of pretrial practice to illustrate ECMC's noncompliant litigation
behavior in undue hardship adversary proceedings. Those categories are
(1) compulsory-disclosure practice, (2) motion practice, (3) responsivepleading practice, and (4) discovery practice. For the time period
studied, the data show that some of ECMC's litigation conduct has
involved high levels of procedural noncompliance. In setting forth the
descriptive statistics, this Section comments on why such instances of
noncompliant behavior should be deemed harmful.
1. Study Design
To document ECMC's procedural noncompliance in undue hardship
litigation, I created an original dataset of adversary proceedings
involving such litigation that were commenced during 2011 and 2012.
To constitute the dataset, I formulated a search query in Bloomberg
Law's "Dockets" database.294 Using the search template for the
database, I limited query retrieval based on the following parameters:
First, in the "Courts" field, I limited the search source to dockets from
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts. Second, to exclude bankruptcy case dockets
ECMC-CA (In re Graber), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-19573, Adv. No. 11-01749 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.

Dec. 12, 2011), ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel, In re
Graber].

291. Declaration Michaelanne Ehrenberg in Support of Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery Responses, Dismiss Proceeding, and for Issuance of Sanctions 8, at 3, Moreno v.
NW Educ. (In re Moreno), Ch. 7 Case No. 05-15973, Adv. No. 05-01416 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
Mar. 30, 2006), ECF No. 17.
292. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal,supra note 2, at 211 n.137.

293. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. To illustrate the potential for attrition
litigation, compare the debtor who can only afford to pay his attorney a $2,500 flat fee for
limited-scope representation (i.e., filing the complaint and negotiating a settlement), see supra
text accompanying notes 233-34, with ECMC, which can afford to pay its attorney $3,226.50 to
file a motion to compel discovery, see Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel, In re Graber,
supra note 290,

10, at 10-11.

294. BLOOMBERG LAW, http://www.bloomberglaw.com/dockets (last visited Oct. 20, 2014)
(subscription required).
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and thus limit query retrieval to adversary proceeding dockets, I entered
"adversary proceeding" in the "Keywords" field. Third, in the "Party
Options" field, I searched for fifty-four terms that would likely capture
the overwhelming majority of diverse non-debtor parties (e.g., creditors,
guarantors, servicers, and debt collectors) who would be named as a
litigant and/or appear in an undue hardship adversary proceeding. 295 In
doing so, I instructed the query retrieval to include such parties
regardless of their role in proceeding (e.g., plaintiff or defendant) and to
include any proceedings involving any of the non-debtor parties for
whom I had searched. Fourth, I formulated the search query to include
both dockets and proceedings and to include all dockets regardless of
the case status (i.e., open or closed). Finally, I included a date restriction
that limited query retrieval to dockets that were opened during the twoyear period beginning on January 1, 2011 and ending on December 31,
2012.
Because Bloomberg Law limits query retrieval to 1000 search
results, I had to run multiple searches due to the over-inclusive nature of
my search for non-debtor parties. The first search produced 989
results; 296 the second search produced 668 results;297 the third search
produced 729 results; 298 the fourth search produced 794 results; 299 and
the fifth search produced 201 results. 30 0 From this list of 3381 results, I
295. This Article uses the term "litigant," rather than "defendant," because of the ability of
either the debtor or the creditor to file a complaint initiating a debt dischargeability
determination. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a). Although debtors and creditors have equal
opportunity to commence a student-loan adversary proceeding, debtors are the ones who
overwhelmingly appear as plaintiffs in such proceedings. See, e.g., infra notes 333-34 and
accompanying text.
296. The first search entered the following terms in the "Party Options" field: "access
group"; "account control technology"; ACS; "action financial services"; AES; "affiliated
computer services"; "allied interstate"; "apollo group"; "CBE Group"; CHELA; "coast
professional"; "collection technology"; college; collegiate; conserve; "delta management";
"direct loan"; "direct loans"; and "directloan."
297. The second search entered the following terms in the "Party Options" field:
"diversified collection"; ecmc; educap; education; educational; "EIS collections"; "EOS-CCA";
ERS; fedloan; "financial asset management systems"; "first mark services"; "FMS Investment";
"GC Services"; "great lakes"; and "guaranty". Running the search for the two-year period
produced more than 1000 results. Accordingly, I ran the search twice: once for the 2011
calendar year-the second search-and once for the 2012 calendar year-the third search.
298. For details regarding the terms entered in the "Party Options" field for the third
search, see supra note 297.
299. The fourth search entered the following terms in the "Party Options" field:
"Immediate Credit Recoveries"; ITT; KHEAA; MHELSA; National Recoveries; NCO Group;
Nelnet; NYSHESC; PHEAA; "Pioneer Credit"; "Premiere Credit"; "Progressive Financial";
"Sallie Mae"; salliemae; "SLM Corporation"; and student.
300. The fifth search entered the following terms in the "Party Options" field: university;
"USA Group Loan"; "Van Ru Credit"; "West Asset Management"; and "Windham
Professionals."
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individually identified the adversary proceedings that involved a
complaint seeking a dischargeability determination regarding
educational debt, of which there were 1439. In approximately 41% (597
of 1439) of those proceedings, ECMC was a named party and/or
appeared in the proceeding. To explore ECMC's procedural
noncompliance in such adversary proceedings, I drew a random sample
of 100 adversary proceedings from the 597 proceedings in which
ECMC was a named party and/or appeared. I independently examined
each proceeding to ascertain the frequency with which certain types of
noncompliance occurred.
2. Evidence of ECMC's Procedural Noncompliance
Here, I present the results of my empirical investigation into
ECMC's procedural noncompliance in undue hardship litigation. Keep
in mind that I have confined this research to examining a limited subset
of litigation conduct by ECMC over a two-year period. In light of this,
the findings set forth below cannot be generalized to other areas of
ECMC's litigation conduct or to ECMC's litigation in the same areas
during a different time period. Despite that disclaimer, these findings
nonetheless reveal past patterns of ECMC's litigation conduct.
Knowledge about those patterns will hopefully generate a better
understanding of how the litigation conduct of repeat institutional
creditors like ECMC might exacerbate the access-to-justice barriers that
inhere in undue hardship litigation.
I focus on four categories of pretrial practice to illustrate instances of
ECMC's noncompliant litigation behavior in undue hardship adversary
proceedings: (1) compulsory-disclosure practice, (2) motion practice,
(3) responsive-pleading practice, and (4) discovery practice. To be sure,
the noncompliance may seem more egregious in some categories than
others. My goal, however, is simply to demonstrate a range of
noncompliance-that is, litigation behavior demonstrating a consistent
disregard for the rules irrespective of the magnitude of the harm that the
noncompliance may cause.
a. Compulsory-Disclosure Practice
The first example of pretrial practice by ECMC that demonstrates its
procedural noncompliance relates to a mandated disclosure that
corporate parties in adversary proceedings must make. Any
nongovernmental corporate party to an adversary proceeding (other than
the debtor) must file a corporate ownership statement identifying "[a]ny
corporation... that directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of any
class of the [corporate party's] equity interests.",30 1 If no corporation
301. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7007.1(a).
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holds such an ownership interest in the corporate party, the party
nevertheless must file a statement indicating "that there are no entities
to report., 30 2 The corporate party must file the statement with its first
pleading in the adversary proceeding. 30 3 The purpose of the compulsory
disclosure is to provide information that will facilitate a determination
by the presiding judge as to whether her own disqualification
is
30 4
appropriate under the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.
The extent of procedural noncompliance by ECMC in this instance is
quite striking. Based on the random sample, ECMC failed to file the
corporate ownership statement in approximately 81.3% [72.2, 87.9]305
of the undue hardship adversary proceedings in which it appeared in
2011 and 2012.306 And even when ECMC managed to file the corporate
ownership statement, it occasionally failed to comply with the strict
letter of the law-for
example, by failing to file the statement with its
30 7
first pleading.
The significance of such procedural noncompliance is that, in the
overwhelming majority of these adversary proceedings, ECMC has
failed to provide the presiding judge with the information necessary to
determine whether she has a financial interest in ECMC that would
warrant self-disqualification. Even assuming that ECMC would not
have had to report any entity in the corporate ownership statement if
ECMC had been procedurally compliant, the failure to file the statement
casts a cloud on the legitimacy of the outcomes of proceedings that
ended favorably for ECMC.

302. Id.
303. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7007.1(b).
304. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7007.1 advisory committee notes.

305. This Article uses the notation [#, #] to indicate the lower and upper bounds of the 95%
confidence interval for estimates. This Article follows the recommendation to use (1) the Wilson
interval for estimates based on forty observations or less, and (2) the Agresti-Coull interval for
estimates based on more than forty observations. See Lawrence D. Brown et al., Interval
Estimationfor a Binomial Proportion, 16 STAT. SCl. 101, 115 (2001).
306. Recall that the random sample consists of 100 undue hardship adversary proceedings
in which ECMC was a named party and/or made an appearance. See supra Subsection IlI.B. 1.
ECMC made an appearance in 96 of the 100 proceedings. Because the compulsory-disclosure
requirement would apply only in this subset of proceedings, the estimate is based on the subset.
For the four proceedings in which ECMC did not make an appearance, the debtor had originally
named ECMC as a defendant. ECMC may not have appeared due to procedural noncompliance
by the debtor, such as insufficient service of process. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Adversary
Proceeding as to Defendant ECMC Only, Watkins v. ECMC (In re Watkins), Ch. 7 Case No.
09-77414, Adv. No. 12-04207 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2012), ECF No. 8 [hereinafter
Dismissal Order, In re Watkins] (dismissing undue hardship adversary proceeding with respect
to one defendant based on improper service of summons and complaint).
307. See, e.g., Docket, Finley v. Conduit BONY ELT SLMA Cavalier Fund (In re Finley),
Ch. 7 Case No. 11-47177, Adv. No. 12-04039 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. opened Apr. 17, 2012).
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b. Motion Practice
The second example of pretrial practice by ECMC illustrating its
procedural noncompliance relates to its motion practice-specifically,
the manner in which ECMC sets forth the grounds in its motions to join
those proceedings in which the debtor has not originally named ECMC
as a defendant in the complaint. In such proceedings, ECMC will make
its motion pursuant to one of the various joinder mechanisms set forth
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules)-primarily,
intervention or substitution. 308 The Federal Rules generally provide that
a "motion must.., state with particularity the grounds for seeking the
order., 30 9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated
that "[t]he purpose of the particularity requirement ...is to afford
notice of the grounds and prayer of the motion to both the court and to
the opposing party, providing that party with a meaningful opportunity
to respond and the court with enough information to process the motion
correctly."' 1° Accordingly, courts have invoked the particularity
requirement when litigants have failed to specify the Federal Rule upon
which the movant has based the request for relief.31 ' Courts have also
invoked the particularity requirement when litigants have made
allegations that are312too general and not substantiated with factual
support or evidence.
When considering application of the particularity requirement in this
context, an understanding of the nature of the evidentiary burden
imposed on a movant seeking intervention or substitution is crucial.
This burden informs what the particularity threshold ought to be for
such motions. First and foremost, the movant bears the burden of proof
to establish that the court should grant relief, whether the relief
requested314 is intervention,3 1 3 or substitution based on the transfer of an
interest. Intervention of right requires the movant to establish that he
308. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24, 25(c); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024, 7025 (incorporating
Rules 24 and 25 in adversary proceedings).
309. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7007 (incorporating Rule 7
in adversary proceedings).
310. Registration Control Sys., Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 807 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
311. See, e.g., Comspec Int'l, Inc. v. RentSonic, L.L.C., No. 2:10-CV-12601, 2012 WL
368424, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2012); Frees v. Duby, No. 1:10-cv-609, 2010 WL 4923535,
at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2010); Rivera v. Berg Elec. Corp., No. 2:08-cv-01 176, 2010 WL
3002000, at *1 (D. Nev. July 28, 2010).
312. See, e.g., Comspec Int'l, 2012 WL 368424, at *1-2.
313. See, e.g., FREER, supra note 224, § 12.6.3, at 732.
314. The manner in which the Rule 25(c) is structured strongly suggests that the burden of
proof ought to rest on the movant seeking to be substituted for or joined with an original party to
the action. Subsequent to a transfer of interest, Rule 25(c) contemplates that the litigation will
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"claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." 315 On
the other hand, permissive intervention requires the movant to establish
that he "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact." 316 Finally, substitution based on a

transfer of interest requires the movant to establish that, under
applicable substantive law, the movant has become the successor-in317
interest to the originally named party who transferred the interest.
Given these details, how should the particularity requirement of the
Federal Rules apply in this context? In the overwhelming majority of
proceedings in which ECMC seeks to join the litigation, it should plead
in its motion one particular, dispositive fact-that a creditor or
guarantor has assigned to ECMC the debtor's student loan. The reason
for this is that ECMC's agreement with the DOE generally limits
318
ECMC's bankruptcy-servicing role to this specific scenario.
Moreover, one would expect ECMC to support its motion with
documentation indicating that such a transfer had occurred. The
procedural posture of the adversary proceeding, of course, will dictate
whether an intervention or substitution motion (or some combination
thereof) should be brought by ECMC. 319 Regardless, one would expect
ECMC to indicate the Federal Rule on which ECMC had based its
request for relief.
I examined the dockets of the proceedings in the random sample to
ascertain whether ECMC failed to comply with the particularity
requirement when it sought to join an adversary proceeding in which the
continue with the original parties to the action. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1958, at 696 (3d ed. 2007). Because substitution and joinder

are the exceptions to this rule and must be sought by motion, it is reasonable to conclude that the
movant should bear the burden of proof in this context. For a discussion on the absence of
guidance in the Federal Rules regarding the application of Rule 25(c), see Luxliner P.L. Export,
Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1993).
315. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). In this context, no federal statute confers "an unconditional
right to intervene." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).
316. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). In this context, no federal statute confers "a conditional
right to intervene." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A).
317. See Standard Fed. Bank v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 695, 708 (Fed. Cl. 2002).
318. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text. If, however, ECMC was the original
guarantor of the student loan, see supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text, one would expect
ECMC to allege that fact in its motion (and also, possibly, the transfer of the loan from the
creditor to ECMC).
319. For an example of when ECMC has failed to utilize the proper joinder mechanism, see
Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Bernal (In re Bernal), 207 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that ECMC should have sought to join the litigation via substitution rather than
intervention).
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debtor did not originally name ECMC as a defendant. I tracked
particularity deficiencies according to three metrics.32 ° First, if ECMC
failed to make any factual allegation that it was an assignee of a student
32 2
loan, 32 1 I considered the motion to have a particularity deficiency.

Along the same lines, if ECMC alleged in the alternative that the
student loan had been or would be assigned to it in the future, 323 1
considered the motion to have a particularity deficiency. 324 Second, if
ECMC failed to support its motion with any documentation indicating
that a transfer had occurred, I considered the motion to have a
particularity deficiency. 32 Finally, if ECMC failed to indicate the
320. Recall that the random sample consists of 100 undue hardship adversary proceedings
in which ECMC was a named party and/or made an appearance. See supra Subsection III.B. 1.
ECMC was not originally named as a defendant in 76 of the 100 proceedings. ECMC made a
motion to join the litigation in 69 of the 76 proceedings. In the 69 proceedings in which ECMC
made a motion, 2 of the proceedings involved an oral motion made during a hearing.
Accordingly, I was able to track particularity deficiencies in 67 of the 69 proceedings in which
ECMC made a motion to join the litigation.
321. Or, in the alternative, that it was the original guarantor of the student loan (and also,
possibly, that it had accepted transfer of the loan from the creditor). See supra note 318.
322. I considered a motion as nondeficient if it made any factual allegation whatsoever
indicating assignment of the student loan to ECMC. In some instances, however, this approach
may have been overly generous given the threadbare nature of the allegation. See, e.g., Motion
to Add ECMC as a Defendant at 1, Williams v. Sallie Mae Inc. (In re Williams), Ch. 7 Case No.
12-07045, Adv. No. 12-07045 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 5, 2012), ECF No. 8 (setting forth only
three sentences of allegations, only one of which alleged assignment by stating that "ECMC has
been assigned seven (7) Stafford loans from USAF").
323. See, e.g., Educational Credit Management Corp.'s Motion to Intervene as Defendant,
to Amend the Caption, and for Leave to File an Answer 3, at 2, Henry v. Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (In re Henry), Ch. 7 Case No. 12-71257, Adv. No. 12-07044 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Sept. 28,
2012), ECF No. 30 ("Certain student loans owed by the Debtor have been or will be assigned by
NSLP to ECMC.").
324. After all, if ECMC's bankruptcy-servicing role requires it to have taken assignment of
a student loan for which a debtor seeks a dischargeability determination, an allegation that fails
to represent to the court that such an assignment has occurred must be deficient, notwithstanding
that the assignment may occur in the future. See supra notes 312, 318 and accompanying text.
This is particularly so in the context of a substitution motion, pursuant to which the movant
must establish that an interest has been transferred. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
325. I considered a motion as nondeficient if it was supported by any documentation
whatsoever indicating assignment of the student loan to ECMC. In some instances, however,
this approach may have been overly generous given the threadbare nature of the documentation.
For example, in one adversary proceeding, ECMC attached to its substitution motion a two-page
exhibit that consisted of (1) a two-sentence letter stating, in relevant part, that USA
Funds "hereby assigns to the Educational Credit Management Corporation... its rights, title,
and interest in those student loans listed in the enclosure to this letter" and (2) a skeletal
spreadsheet virtually devoid of information. Motion to Substitute Educational Credit
Management Corp. for Defendant Sallie Mae, Inc., Exhibit B, Rogers v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Rogers), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-40437, Adv. No. 11-04112 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 2,
2011), ECF No. 12-2.
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Federal Rule on which it had based its request
326 for relief, I considered
the motion to have a particularity deficiency.
Based on the random sample, debtors did not originally name ECMC
as a defendant in their complaints in approximately 76.0% [66.7, 83.3]
of the undue hardship adversary proceedings from 2011 and 2012 in
which ECMC was a named party and/or appeared.327 Remarkably, for
the proceedings in which ECMC was not an originally named
defendant, ECMC failed to make any motion to be made a party to the
litigation in approximately 9.2% [4.3, 18.1] of such proceedings-but
nonetheless acted as if the court had made it a party, impermissibly
serving and filing substantive motions, responsive pleadings, or both.
Furthermore, for the proceedings in which ECMC made a written
motion to be made a party to the litigation, 328 the data suggest a high
rate of particularity deficiencies-that is, failure to allege assignment of
the loan, failure to provide documentation of the loan assignment, or
failure to indicate the applicable Federal Rule (or a combination
thereof). ECMC's motion contained at least one of these particularity
deficiencies in approximately 80.6% [69.4, 88.4] of those proceedings.
More specifically, approximately 35.8% [25.4, 47.8] of the motions
failed to allege assignment of the loan; 77.6% [66.2, 86.0] of the
motions failed to provide documentation of the loan's assignment; and
19.4% [11.6, 30.6] failed to indicate the Federal Rule pursuant to which
the court should grant the requested relief.
In sum, ECMC's motion practice demonstrates consistent
deficiencies in stating with particularity the grounds for joining
adversary proceedings in which the debtor did not originally name
ECMC as a defendant. Such procedural noncompliance is significant
because it calls into question the legitimacy of a court's decision to
allow a movant, who may not have a valid basis to join the litigation,329
326. I considered a motion as nondeficient if it made any mention whatsoever of a Federal
Rule. In some instances, however, this approach may have been overly generous given the
threadbare legal grounds articulated by ECMC. For example, in one intervention motion, ECMC
neither set forth the substantive standard for when intervention is appropriate, nor did it indicate
whether it sought intervention of right or permissive intervention. Instead, the motion set forth a
conclusory sentence that cited Rule 24. See Motion by Educational Credit Management Corp. to
Intervene and Be Added as a Defendant 5, at 2, Ruiz v. Chase (In re Ruiz), Ch. 7 Case No. 1240600, Adv. No. 12-04031 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2012), ECF No. 7 ("Thus, ECMC will be
the sole holder of the Student Loan and, as such, ECMC submits that its request for intervention
and to be added as a party herein is warranted under F.R.Civ.P., Rule 24.").
327. Many of the estimates set forth in this Subsection are based on this subset of adversary
proceedings and will accordingly be noted where relevant.
328. See supra note 320.
329. For example, courts have noted in both reported and unreported opinions that ECMC
has provided either an inconsistent or improper account of its interest in the student loan(s) at
issue. See Alfes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Alfes), 709 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 2013);
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Corbett (In re Corbett), Ch. 7 Case No. CV-08-1672, 2009 WL
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to upend the plaintiff-debtor's ability to determine the structure of the
adversary proceeding. 330 Concomitantly, if courts have not been vigilant
in putting ECMC to its proof when determining ECMC's status as
assignee of the student loan, 33 1 it suggests that courts may also have
given short shrift (or no attention at all) to the question of whether
ECMC's presence would facilitate the litigation in the proceeding-a
relevant 33inquiry
when considering both intervention and substitution
2
motions.

c. Responsive-Pleading Practice
The third example of pretrial practice by ECMC demonstrating
procedural noncompliance relates to its responsive-pleading practicespecifically, the manner in which ECMC has responded to debtors'
complaints seeking a determination of the dischargeability of their
student loans. Although both debtors and creditors may initiate such
determinations,333 debtors initiated every adversary proceeding in the
random sample. Accordingly, ECMC's litigant role in such proceedings
3 34
will almost always, if not exclusively, be that of a defendant.
As a defendant, ECMC has an affirmative obligation to answer the
debtor's complaint or to serve a defensive motion in response to the
complaint. 335 Whether the answer was permissibly and timely served
depends on the manner in which ECMC was brought into the
proceeding. In the random sample, ECMC was generally brought into
684810, at *4 n.9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2009). Moreover, even if one assumes that ECMC does
comply with the particularity requirements when presenting its intervention or substitution
motion, it is not a fait accompli that ECMC should be allowed to join the litigation. First and
foremost, a guarantor's economic interest in litigation, by itself, may not be a sufficient interest
for a court to permit intervention of right for the guarantor. See Ouch v. Sharpless, 237 F.R.D.
163, 165-66 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Second, permissive intervention and substitution are
discretionary types of relief that a court is not required to grant. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
v. Bemal (In re Bernal), 207 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that substitution is
discretionary); Ouch, 237 F.R.D. at 166 (explaining that permissive intervention is
discretionary).
330. See FREER, supra note 224, § 12.6.3, at 734, 736; cf 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note

314, § 1958, at 696 ("The most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is that it does not require that
anything be done after an interest has been transferred. The action may be continued.., against
the original party, and the judgment will be binding on the successor in interest even though the
successor is not named.").
331. For an example of a court that has been vigilant on this front, see Srinivasan v. Sallie
Mae, Inc. (In reSrinivasan),2010 WL 3633062, at *1, *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2010).
332. See In re Bernal, 207 F.3d at 598-99; FREER, supra note 224, § 12.6.3, at 736.
333. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a).

334.
receives
debtor's
335.

This phenomenon can largely be attributed to the manner in which ECMC purportedly
assignment of FFELP loans and the timing of such assignments (i.e., subsequent to the
initiation of the adversary proceeding). See supra Section III.A.
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a)-(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
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the proceeding pursuant to one of three scenarios: (1) the debtor
originally named ECMC as a defendant in the complaint initiating the
adversary proceeding; (2) the court substituted ECMC as a defendant, or
(3) the court allowed ECMC to intervene as a defendant.336 The
remainder of this Subsection will discuss each of these scenarios with
respect to ECMC's responsive-pleading practice.
The first scenario entails those proceedings in which the debtor
originally named ECMC as a defendant in the complaint. When a
defendant is originally named in the complaint, the defendant must
serve a response to the complaint within thirty days after the issuance of
the summons, 337 and the defendant must file the response with the court
"within a reasonable time after service. 3 3 8 If the defendant fails to
serve a timely response and does not request an extension of time prior
to the expiration of the response deadline, then the defendant must
move for permission to serve the untimely response on the basis that the
defendant's failure was "excusable neglect." 339 Only if the court grants
the motion should it allow the defendant to serve what would otherwise
have been an untimely response. 340 Finally, while a defendant has the
right (without court approval) to amend its answer once within twentyone days after serving it,34 1 the defendant may amend after the
expiration of this time
period only with the plaintiffs consent or the
342
permission.
court's
I examined the dockets of the proceedings in the random sample to
ascertain whether ECMC served an improper response to the debtor's
complaint when ECMC was an originally named defendant. I define an
"improper response" in this scenario as either an answer, amended
answer, or Rule 12(b) motion that ECMC untimely served without
obtaining the court's approval. To determine whether the response was
336. There were seven proceedings in the random sample in which ECMC sought to be
brought into the proceeding on multiple grounds (e.g., substitution and intervention).
337. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see also FED. R. BANKR. P.
7012(b) ("Rule 12(b)-(i) F.R.Civ.P applies in adversary proceedings.").
338. FED. R. CIv. P. 5(d)(1); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7005 (incorporating, without
change, Rule 5 in adversary proceedings).
339. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1). The Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), the determination of whether neglect is excusable "is at bottom an
equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission."
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The Court
indicated that such circumstances include "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in
good faith." Id.
340. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).

341. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7015 (incorporating,
without change, Rule 15 in adversary proceedings).
342. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a)(2).
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untimely, I consulted the date of the issuance of the summons as well as
the service date of ECMC's response as set forth in the certificate of
service filed by ECMC. Based on the random sample, debtors originally
named ECMC as a defendant in their complaints in approximately
24.0% [16.6, 33.3] of the undue hardship adversary proceedings from
2011 and 2012 in which ECMC was a named party and/or made an
appearance. Based on a subset of these proceedings, ECMC served an
improper response in approximately 25.0% [11.2, 46.8] of the undue
hardship adversary proceedings from 2011343and 2012 in which ECMC
appeared as an originally named defendant.
The second and third scenarios entail those proceedings in which
ECMC was not an originally named defendant, but the court substituted
ECMC as a defendant or allowed ECMC to intervene as a defendant.
Each of these procedural devices has distinct features that further
inform the analysis of procedural compliance by ECMC in responding
to a debtor's complaint.
First, consider those scenarios involving substitution. The Federal
Rules provide that, "[i]f an interest is transferred, the action may be
continued . . .against the original party unless the court, on motion,
orders the transferee to be substituted in the action or joined with the
original party."344 Until substituted for an originally named defendant
the movant will neither be a party to nor a defendant in the litigation. 34
Accordingly, in those instances in which the original defendant has not
served a response to the complaint and the movant desires to do so, it is
proper for the movant to serve such a response only after the court has
granted the substitution motion. 346 Moreover, once the court substitutes
the movant for the originally named defendant, the substituted party will
be bound to the response deadline of its predecessor (absent a court
343. ECMC was named as an original defendant in twenty-four of the proceedings in the
random sample. In four of those proceedings, however, ECMC did not make an appearance. See
supra note 306. Accordingly, the reported estimate is based on the twenty proceedings in the
random sample in which ECMC was originally named as a defendant and made an appearance.
344. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(c); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7025 (incorporating Rule 25 in
adversary proceedings).
345. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S.Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (stating that "'[a] 'party' to
litigation is '[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought,' or one who 'become[s] a party by
intervention, substitution, or third-party practice' (alterations in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 2234 (2009) and

Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987))).
346. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a) (providing that a "defendant shall serve an answer");

FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (providing that "a party may assert... [certain] defenses"); see also FED.
R. BANKi. P. 7012(b) (providing that Rule 12(b) applies in adversary proceedings); cf 7C
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 314, § 1958, at 696 ("The most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is
that it does not require that anything be done after an interest has been transferred. The action
may be continued ...against the original party, and the judgment will be binding on the
successor in interest even though the successor is not named.").
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order directing otherwise).347 As such, if the response deadline has
expired at the time the substituted party enters the case, the substituted
party will have to seek the court's permission
to serve the untimely
348
response on the basis of excusable neglect.
Next, consider those scenarios involving intervention. The Federal
Rules provide that an intervention motion "must ... be accompanied by

a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is
sought." 349 When seeking to intervene as a defendant, the movant must
"offer an answer in intervention, which responds to the plaintiff's
350
anticipated claim against her once intervention is granted.,
Importantly, as with substitution, 35 1 the movant will neither be a party to
nor a defendant in the litigation until the court grants the intervention
motion. 352 Thus, it is improper for a would-be intervenor to serve a
response to the debtor's353complaint prior to, or separate and apart from,
an intervention motion.

I examined the dockets of the proceedings in the random sample to
ascertain whether ECMC served an improper response to the debtor's
complaint when ECMC was not an originally named defendant but
sought to be substituted or to intervene as a defendant. For those
proceedings where ECMC sought to substitute, I define an "improper
response" as either an answer or Rule 12(b) motion that: (1) ECMC
served before the court granted the substitution motion or (2) ECMC
untimely served after the court granted the substitution motion and
without first obtaining the court's approval to serve the out-of-time
347. In describing the "nature of substitution in federal litigation," the Seventh Circuit has
noted that the litigation status of the transferee who is substituted pursuant to Rule 25(c) must
track the position of its transferor: "Any other approach would make a shambles of litigation; a
party could sell its interest or change its internal structure ... and require the court to start the
case from scratch." Brook, Weiner, Sered, Kreger & Weinberg v. Coreq, Inc., 53 F.3d 851, 852
(7th Cir. 1995). Thus, a successor-in-interest who is substituted for an original party "takes the
case as he finds it." Id.; see also Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Bernal (In re Bernal), 207 F.3d
595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Only at a later time were the notes, and any possible rights under
them, transferred to ECMC. That was, therefore, the very paradigm of an assignment controlled
by Rule 25(c), and ECMC was bound by what had gone on before."); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that, under Federal Rule 25(c),
"[w]hen the successor in interest voluntarily steps into the shoes of its predecessor, it assumes
the obligations of the predecessor's pending litigation").
348. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
349. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024 (incorporating Rule 24 in
adversary proceedings).
350. FREER, supra note 224, § 12.6.3, at 736.
351. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
352. FREER, supra note 224, § 12.6.3, at 736.
353. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a) (providing that "the defendant shall serve an answer");
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (providing that "a party may assert... [certain] defenses"); FED. R. CIV. P.
24(c); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b) (providing that Rule 12(b) applies in adversary
proceedings); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024 (incorporating Rule 24 in adversary proceedings).
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response. For those proceedings where ECMC sought to intervene, I
define an "improper response" as either (1) an answer or Rule 12(b)
motion that ECMC served before it served its intervention motion or
(2) an intervention motion served without, or separate and apart from,
ECMC's answer. To determine whether a response was improper, I
consulted the date of the issuance of the summons, the service dates of
ECMC's response and motion to substitute or intervene as set forth in
the certificates of service filed by ECMC, and the date of the court's
order granting the substitution or intervention motion.
For those proceedings in which debtors did not originally name
ECMC as a defendant in their complaints and in which ECMC moved
in writing to be made a party to the litigation, 354 ECMC served an
improper response approximately 89.9% [80.2, 95.2] of the time. The
significance of such procedural noncompliance is twofold. First, a
prematurely served answer has the potential to create mischief where
there should be none. As the litigation progresses, a defendant might
argue that the debtor waived or is estopped from taking certain action
given the defendant's service of its answer. For example, a plaintiff may
amend her complaint without court approval only once and only within
twenty-one days after the defendant has served an answer to the
complaint (assuming that the defendant did not serve a Rule 12 motion
in response to the complaint).355 One might imagine a defendant arguing
that the debtor's opportunity to amend as of right had expired.356 In the
end, premature answers allow defendants to impose the costs of their
noncompliant behavior on debtors who must uncover the potential
ramifications of such behavior. Furthermore, a tardily served answer
allows a defendant to escape its obligation to explain its neglect in
failing to serve a timely answer.357 Permitting a defendant to shirk this
accountability mechanism creates the perception that the court has

354. See supra note 320.
355. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(B); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7015 (incorporating Rule

15 in adversary proceedings).
356. Such an argument would likely take the form of a motion to strike the debtor's
amended complaint. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(f)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b) (incorporating
Federal Rule 12(f) in adversary proceedings). Rule 12(f) confers upon a court the authority to
strike a pleading in its entirety. See Culinary & Serv. Emps. Union, AFL-CIO Local 555 v.
Haw. Emp. Benefit Admin., Inc., 688 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1982).
357. Cf Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Bernal (In re Bernal), 207 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.
2000) ("ECMC, it seems, does not wish to confront the default by CSAC or attempt to explain
that default.... Rather, it has intoned a monody about how difficult it was for ECMC to
proceed in a timely fashion. That is all well and good, if unimpressive. Nevertheless, it does not
even begin to explain why CSAC, its predecessor, allowed its default to be taken, and that is
what ECMC would have to do were it allowed to substitute into this action now that it has been
assigned CSAC's rights." (footnote omitted)).
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extended preferential treatment to a procedurally noncompliant litigant.358
d. Discovery Practice
The last example of pretrial practice by ECMC demonstrating
procedural noncompliance relates to some of its discovery practice.
Keep in mind that the picture presented here will necessarily be an
incomplete one because the Federal Rules require that parties must not
file certain discovery requests and responses with the court "until they
are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing." 359 Because of this,
there may be ongoing discovery activity in an adversary proceeding that
cannot be discerned from the proceeding's docket. Nonetheless, 38% of
the dockets for the adversary proceedings in the random sample had
some evidence of discovery activity-whether in the form of
prematurely filed discovery requests and responses; 360 discovery
requests and responses filed pursuant to local bankruptcy rules;
certificates of service of discovery requests and responses; or motions to
compel discovery or to impose discovery sanctions.3 6 Upon examining
these proceedings, one example of procedurally noncompliant discovery
practice by ECMC came to light: prematurely served discovery
requests.
Importantly, in making a suite of discovery devices available to
litigants, the Federal Rules limit the use of such devices to partiesto the
litigation.362 The Supreme Court has stated that the Federal Rules are to
be interpreted according to their plain meaning, 363 and it has further
observed that "[a] 'party' to litigation is '[o]ne by or against whom a
lawsuit is brought,' or one who 'become[s] a party by intervention,
substitution, or third-party practice."' 364 On this authority, it is readily
358. Cf. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985) ("Filing deadlines... necessarily
operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall just on the other side of them,
but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced.").
359. FED. R. CIv. P. 5(d)(1); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7005 (incorporating Rule 5 in
adversary proceedings). The specific discovery requests and responses to which Rule 5 refers

are "depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents or tangible things or to permit entry
onto land, and requests for admission." FED. R. CIv. P. 5(d)(1).
360. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
361. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7037 (incorporating Rule 37 in
adversary proceedings).
362. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (providing that "a party may serve... written
interrogatories" (emphasis added)); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (providing that "[a] party may
serve" a request to produce documents (emphasis added)); FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1) (providing
that "[a] party may serve" requests for admissions (emphasis added)); see also FED. R. BANKR.
P. 7033, 7034, 7036 (incorporating Rules 33, 34, and 36 in adversary proceedings).
363. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989).
364. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 2234
(2009) and Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

59

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
2160

FLORIDA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

apparent that a nonparty may not serve discovery requests until it has
joined the litigation.
I examined the dockets of the proceedings in the random sample to
ascertain whether ECMC served a premature discovery request on the
debtor when ECMC was not an originally named defendant, but sought
to be substituted or to intervene as a defendant. I define a "premature
discovery request" as any discovery request that ECMC served on the
debtor before the court entered an order joining ECMC as a party to the
adversary proceeding. To determine whether a discovery request was
premature, I consulted (1) the date of the order that joined ECMC as a
party to the litigation and (2) evidence in the record that clearly
indicated the service date of any discovery request (e.g., a certificate of
service of discovery requests or ECMC's allegations of the service date
of discovery requests in a motion to compel discovery).
For the subset of proceedings in which debtors did not originally
name ECMC as a defendant in their complaints, ECMC served a
premature discovery request on the debtor in approximately 10.5% [5.2,
19.6] of those proceedings. For the reasons stated above, this figure may
understate365the extent to which ECMC has made premature discovery
requests.
The significance of such procedural noncompliance is that, like
prematurely served answers, 366 prematurely served discovery requests
have the potential to create mischief where there should be none. For
example, one might imagine a defendant arguing that, because a debtor
had failed to respond to its prematurely served requests for admissions
within thirtyi days of their service, the matters therein should be deemed
admitted,
and thus conclusively established.3 68 Lest the reader think
this scenario is far-fetched, this Article now highlights one adversary
proceeding in which a variation of this scenario occurred.
In Sykes v. Devry, Inc. (In re Sykes),3 69 the bankruptcy court entered
an order allowing ECMC to intervene in the proceeding on February 18,
201 1.370 Two days before the court entered the order, however, ECMC,
as a nonparty to the litigation, prematurely served discovery requests on

365. See supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 355-58 and accompanying text.
367. See FED. R. CIv. P. 36(a)(3).
368. See FED. R. CIv. P. 36(b).
369. Docket, Sykes v. Devry, Inc. (In re Sykes), Ch. 7 Case No. 09-17091, Adv. No. 1101015 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. opened Jan. 24, 2011).
370. Unopposed Ex Parte Order Granting Educational Credit Management Corporation
Leave to Intervene as Additional Party Defendant at 2, Sykes, Ch. 7 Case No. 09-17091, Adv.
No. 11-01015 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 9.
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the debtor with a response date of March 18, 2011 371 On March 22 and
March 29, 2011, ECMC unsuccessfully attempted to contact debtor's
counsel by telephone and by e-mail.372 Five days after its last attempt at
contacting debtor's counsel (and only eighteen days after the response
deadline to the discovery requests), ECMC served a motion seeking
both dismissal of the debtor's complaint with prejudice and partial
summary judgment determining the debtor's student loans to be
nondischargeable.373 ECMC's summary )udgment motion entirely
hinged on the debtor's deemed admissions. 74 The admissions included
(1) an admission that the student loan was an educational loan within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code's student-loan-dischargeability
provision 375-and (2) that the student loan would not impose an undue
hardship on the debtor and his dependents. 376 The debtor did not
respond to ECMC's motion, which the court ultimately granted.377
To be sure, debtor's counsel should have sought to engage with
ECMC and should have objected to ECMC's summary judgment
motion. But none of that excuses the procedural noncompliance by
ECMC that resulted in an adverse ruling against the debtor. To
understand the scope of procedural noncompliance by ECMC in Sykes,
one must consider the following principles: First, premature discovery
requests violate the Federal Rules, and courts thus may consider them
void and unenforceable in appropriate circumstances. 8 Second, the
Federal Rules do not permit a party to request an admission of a
conclusion of law. 379 Finally, when the moving party to a summary
judgment motion has failed to carry her initial burden of proof to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party need not respond to the motion to prevail.38 °
In Sykes, ECMC predicated its summary judgment motion solely on
what it alleged were deemed admissions. But the admissions requests
were premature such that the court should have disregarded them.
371. See Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in
Support Thereof 1, at 2, Sykes, Ch. 7 Case No. 09-17091, Adv. No. 11-01015 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. Apr. 5, 2011), ECF No. 17.
372. Id. T 3, at 2.
373. See id. 77 6-14, at 2-6.

374. See id. 7 10-11, at 4-5.
375. See id. 10, at 5 (Request No. 10).
376. See id. (Request No. 17).
377. See Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and for Partial
Summary Judgment at 2, Sykes, Ch. 7 Case No. 09-17091, Adv. No. 11-01015 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. May 10, 2011), ECF No. 22.
378. See Khalil v. Transunion, LLC, No. 08-10303, 2008 WL 4642857, at *2-3 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 20, 2008).
379. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 1999);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1) (defining scope of requests for admissions).
380. See FREER, supra note 224, § 9.4, at 477-78.
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Moreover, two of the admissions requests made by ECMC in Sykesthat the student loan was an educational loan within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code and that the student loan would not impose an undue
hardship-were requests for admissions of conclusions of law.38 ' At the
end of the day, because ECMC's summary judgment motion was tainted
with procedural noncompliance, the bankruptcy court should have
determined that ECMC had failed to carry its burden of proof even
though the debtor had not presented evidence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
It has been argued that, "[b]ecause the costs incidental to discovery
production are, morally and economically, properly attributable to the
requesting party, allocation of discovery costs to the producing party
effectively transforms discovery costs into a litigation subsidy, which
requires a party to fund a portion of its opponent's case." 382 When one
couples this view with the possibility that some student-loan debtors
must contend with procedurally noncompliant discovery requests such
as those documented here, it makes one think twice about Congress's
381. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004);
Cazenovia College v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000).
382. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost
Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 773, 778 (2011). There
have also been instances in which ECMC has not complied with its initial disclosure
obligations, thereby potentially shifting production costs to debtors to the extent that they are
forced to compel ECMC to comply with such obligations. Recall that a creditor bears the burden
of proof in an undue hardship adversary proceeding to establish the amount owed by the debtor,
which necessarily entails a detailed accounting of the rights to payment arising from the studentloan obligation as determined by non-bankruptcy law. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying
text. Rule 26 requires that "a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the
other parties ... a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). This obligation "requires more than providing-without any
explanation-undifferentiated financial statements; it requires a 'computation,' supported by
documents." Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). Importantly, the
computational disclosure requirement applies in adversary proceedings to determine the
dischargeability of a debt. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Sambrano (In re Sambrano), 440 B.R.
702, 704-05, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2010). Furthermore, a claim arising from a default on a
promissory note that evidences a student-loan obligation constitutes a claim for monetary
damages. See United States v. Ragan, No. CV 10-7654 RSWL, 2011 WL 2940354, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. July 21, 2011). Accordingly, absent a court order or stipulation to the contrary, student-loan
creditors should initially disclose computational evidence of the amounts owed by the debtor in
undue hardship adversary proceedings. But there have been instances in which ECMC either has
asserted that it has no damages to claim or has set forth the amount of damages without
providing a computational explanation. See, e.g., Defendant Educational Credit Management
Corp.'s Initial Rule 26(a)(1) and (a)(2) Disclosures at 4, Gesualdi v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
(In re Gesualdi), Ch. 7 Case No. 07-12637, Adv. No. 12-01816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2013),
ECF No. 50 (failing to claim damages); ECMC's FRCP (26)(a)(1) and Expert Disclosures 3,
at 2, Tippens v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Tippens), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-10768, Adv. No.
11-01354 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 12 (listing loan balance, but failing to
provide computational explanation).
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decision to require debtors to litigate their eligibility for forgiveness of
debt within the extant procedural framework for adversary proceedings.
C. A Case Study of Pollutive Litigation: ECMC's Frivolous
Claim PreclusionArgument
Having set forth various examples of ECMC's procedural
noncompliance, this Article now turns to a prime example of ECMC's
pollutive litigation-the frivolous argument that the doctrine of claim
preclusion prevents a Chapter 7 debtor from initiating an undue
hardship adversary proceeding after having been granted a discharge in
his underlying bankruptcy case.
ECMC's claim preclusion argument recklessly seeks to deprive
student-loan debtors of their legitimate day in court. Its provenance and
evolution appears to be as follows: ECMC marshaled the argument in
December 2009 in a student-loan adversary proceeding before the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California in Ehmke v.
Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Ehmke).383 The following year, in 2010, ECMC
raised the argument, for the first time on appeal, before the U.S.
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit (the Eighth Circuit
BAP) in Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker).384 In
January 2011, ECMC raised the argument again in Watkins v.
Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Watkins),385 a studentloan adversary proceeding before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Missouri. Finally, in September 2011, ECMC raised
the argument in Thurman v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re
Thurman),386 a student-loan adversary proceeding before the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington.
Each time that ECMC has raised the argument, it has had the same
basic thrust: The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents a Chapter 7
debtor from initiating an undue hardship adversary proceeding after the

383. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of Educational
Credit Management Corp. to Intervene, to Dismiss and for a More Definite Statement-Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 24, 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(e) at 6-7, Ehmke v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In
re Ehmke), Ch. 7 Case No. 98-71834, Adv. No. 09-4364 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009), ECF
No. 12-1 [hereinafter Memorandum, In re Ehmke].
384. 427 B.R. 471, 476-77 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010), aff'don other grounds, 650 F.3d 1227

(8th Cir. 2011).
385. Educational Credit Management Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss at 1-3, Watkins v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Watkins), Ch. 7 Case No. 90-41473, Adv. No. 10-4319 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 17 [hereinafter ECMC's Motion to Dismiss, In re Watkins].
386. Notice and Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Against United Student Aid Funds

at 11, Thurman v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Thurman), Ch. 7 Case No. 97-10126,
Adv. No. 11-01352 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2011), ECF No. 51 [hereinafter Notice and
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, In re Thurman].
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87
court has granted a discharge in her underlying bankruptcy case. 3
Given that the argument solely involves a question of law, 3U whether
that argument is frivolous will turn on whether it is "based on a
conception of the law that is both unsupported and unsupportable under
any existing principle." 38 9 An indicator of an unsupported-andunsupportable conception might be if the proponent of the argument
states it in a conclusory fashion without distinctly pleading the various
legal elements of the argument. In this particular context, ECMC has
never articulated the distinct elements for establishing a claim
preclusion defense 390 when asserting it against student-loan debtors.
Instead, ECMC has talismanically incanted that a discharge order is a
final judgment that has res judicata effect. 39 1 On the other hand, when
ECMC has been on the receiving end of a preclusion argument, it has
been very explicit in calling the court's attention to the debtor's burden
to plead the elements.392
ECMC's success with its claim preclusion argument has been paltry
at best. In In re Ehmke, although the bankruptcy court entered an order
dismissing the debtor's complaint, 393 the court did not state anything in
its order that could be construed to support the claim preclusion
argument (a fact pointed out by the Eighth Circuit BAP in In re
Walker).39 4 The Eighth Circuit BAP flatly rejected the argument in In re
Walker.39 5 In In re Watkins, although the bankruptcy court entered an

387. See In re Walker, 427 B.R. at 477; Memorandum, In re Ehmke, supra note 383, at 6;
ECMC's Motion to Dismiss, In re Watkins, supra note 385, at 7; Notice and Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment, In re Thurman, supra note 386, at 11.
388. E.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2013).
389. Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation,
89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1198 (2014).
390. See infra note 421 and accompanying text (setting forth elements for claim
preclusion).
391. See In re Walker, 427 B.R. at 477, 479; Memorandum, In re Ehmke, supra note 383,
at 6-7; ECMC's Motion to Dismiss, In re Watkins, supra note 385, at 2-3; Notice and Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment, In re Thurman, supra note 386, at 11.
392. See Memorandum of Law in Support of ECMC's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hann), Ch. 13 Case No. 04-13901,
Adv. No. 11-01046 (Bankr. D.N.H. Oct. 7, 2011), ECF No. 30 ("The Debtor cites to the proper
legal standard [for collateral estoppel] but does not engage in any substantive discussion as to
how those elements apply to these facts, or provide any legal authority where collateral estoppel
applied under similar facts. ECMC should therefore prevail....").
393. Order at 2, Ehmke v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Ehmke), Ch. 7 Case No. 98-71834, Adv.
No. 09-4364 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2010), ECF No. 25
394. See In re Walker, 427 B.R. at 479 n.19.
395. See id. at 480. It is worth noting that, after losing before the Eighth Circuit BAP,
ECMC subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, raising three
issues on appeal-none of which involved the claim preclusion argument. See Walker v. Sallie
Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 2011).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/6

64

Burris: Hell Hath No Fury like a Woman Porned: Revenge Porn and the Need
THE UNDUEHARDSHIP THICKET

2165

order dismissing the debtor's complaint, 396 the district court reversed
the bankruptcy court, partly relying on the reasoning set forth by the
Eighth Circuit BAP in In re Walker.397 Finally, the bankruptcy court in
In re Thurman rejected the argument. 398 When ECMC sought leave for
interlocutory appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision, the district court
denied ECMC's motion, stating that no substantial ground for a
difference of opinion existed on the issue of whether the debtor's
complaint initiating
the adversary proceeding was barred by the doctrine
399
judicata.
res
of
It is remarkable that, despite its repeated failures in asserting the
claim preclusion argument in In re Walker and In re Watkins, ECMC
continued to push the argument in In re Thurman. One might
hypothesize that ECMC did so because it is a repeat player that seeks
favorable precedent that will give it further ammunition to deny studentloan debtors their day in court. The injury, of course, was that the debtor
in In re Thurman had to expend a great deal of effort to dispel a
frivolous legal argument. The insults added to this injury were: (1) that
ECMC had previously argued before the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the Ninth Circuit BAP) that the discharge
order in a reopened Chapter 7 case did not have a claim preclusive
effect on the issue of whether the debtor's student loan had been
discharged by the order; and (2) that ECMC prevailed on this
argument. 400 If ever there was a scenario for application of judicial
estoppel-which "prevents a party that has taken one position in
litigating a particular set of facts from later reversing its position when
396. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 2, Watkins v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Watkins), Ch. 7 Case No. 90-41473, Adv. No. 10-4319 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2011), ECF
No. 20.
397. See Queen v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Watkins), 461 B.R. 57, 61 (W.D. Mo.
2011).
398. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Thurman v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Thurman), Ch. 7 Case No. 97-10126, Adv. No. 11-01352
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2011), ECF No. 81.
399. Thurman v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., No. C12-80MJP, 2012 WL 993412, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 21, 2012). Importantly, in articulating the standard for determining whether a
substantial ground for difference of opinion exists, the Ninth Circuit has observed that, "when
novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded jurists might reach contradictory
conclusions, a novel issue may be certified for interlocutory appeal without first awaiting
development of contradictory precedent." Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681,
688 (9th Cir. 2011). If, however, fair-minded jurists would not reach contradictory conclusions,
the attempt to appeal represents an "insistence on litigating a question in the face of controlling
precedents which remove[] every colorable basis in law for the litigant's position," Reid v.
United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1154 (7th Cir. 1983), and is thus pollutive, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
400. See Drysdale v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Drysdale), 248 B.R. 386, 390
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000), affd, 2 F. App'x 776 (9th Cir. 2001).
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it is to its advantage to do SO'9401 and which "is intended to protect
courts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who prevail,
twice on opposite theories" 402 -In re Thurman was a prime
candidate.40 3
If the past is prologue, then one might expect ECMC to continue
asserting its frivolous argument elsewhere throughout the country.40 4
This Article now demonstrates why ECMC's claim preclusion argument
is a prime example of pollutive litigation (with the added hope that
exposing this frivolity will quell further attempts by ECMC to assert the
argument).
As set forth below, when one considers Supreme Court precedent
and the black-letter principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments (the Restatement), on which the Supreme Court and the U.S.
Courts of Appeals have frequently relied, it is clear that the doctrine of
claim preclusion does not prevent a Chapter 7 debtor from initiating an
undue hardship adversary proceeding after the court has granted a
discharge in his underlying bankruptcy case. The argument proceeds as
follows: First, if one properly distinguishes between claim preclusion
and issue preclusion and also takes into account that a discharge order is
the product of an in rem proceeding, one must conclude that the
discharge order has limited preclusive effect that does not prevent the
post-discharge initiation of a student-loan adversary proceeding.
Second, even if one concludes, contrary to Supreme Court precedent,
that a discharge order is the product of an in personam proceeding, a
401. Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1992).
402. Id.
403. Perhaps the greatest tragedy stemming from In re Drysdale is that the bankruptcy
judge who ruled in favor of ECMC at the trial level, see Drysdale, 248 B.R. at 386, and the
attorney who represented ECMC, see id. at 387, were the same bankruptcy judge and ECMC
attorney in In re Ehmke, see Memorandum, In re Ehmke, supra note 383, at 1. Recall that, in In
re Ehmke, ECMC argued that the discharge order did have claim preclusive effect, see id. at 67, which was contrary to its prior position in In re Drysdale, see supra note 400 and
accompanying text. And further recall that the bankruptcy court ruled in ECMC's favor in In re
Ehmke. See supra note 393 and accompanying text. Given this set of circumstances, In re
Ehmke involved an even more compelling scenario for the application of judicial estoppel than
did In re Thurman. Unfortunately, the self-represented debtor in In re Ehmke very likely was not
in a position to make that argument-because she probably did not know about either the Ninth
Circuit BAP's opinion in In re Drysdale or the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel.
404. See, e.g., Educational Credit Management Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss at 6 n.2,
Osborne v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Ch. 7 Case No. 97-52947, Adv. No. 12-05011 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
Apr. 20, 2012), ECF No. 10 ("Indeed, although the Court does not need to reach the issue for
purposes of resolving this motion, resjudicatabars this action as it seeks to relitigate issues that
could or should have been litigated in the original proceeding. Because Plaintiff failed to litigate
the dischargeability of his student loans before receiving a discharge order holding those loans
non-dischargeable, res judicata bars him from seeking to relitigate that issue here." (citations
omitted)).
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Chapter 7 case and a student-loan adversary proceeding do not involve
the same claim, so the discharge order will not have claim preclusive
effect. Finally, even if one concludes that the discharge order is the
product of an in personam proceeding and that a Chapter 7 case and a
student-loan adversary proceeding do involve the same claim, the
statutory-scheme exception to claim preclusion applies in this context,
meaning that the discharge order will still lack claim preclusive effect.
At bottom, regardless of the path taken, ECMC's claim preclusion
argument is a nonstarter.
1. The Distinction Between Claim Preclusion and Issue
Preclusion
The Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of res judicata
encompasses "two discrete effects"-claim preclusion and issue
preclusion-and has relied on the Restatement in support of that
proposition. 40 5 On one hand, "[c]laim preclusion generally refers to the
effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of the very
same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same
issues as the earlier suit.,, 40 6 On the other hand, "[i]ssue preclusion
generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing
successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and
resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,
'4
whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim. 01
Importantly, there are two critical distinctions between claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. First, claim preclusion prevents
litigation of issues that have never been litigated whereas issue
preclusion does not.408 Second, a "valid and final personal judgment"
triggers claim preclusion, 40 9 whereas a "valid and final judgment"
triggers issue preclusion.410 In other words, a final judgment rendered in
an in personam proceeding will have claim preclusive effect between
parties, whereas a final judgment rendered in an in rem proceeding will
not.41 1

405. Thomas ex rel. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 n.5 (1998) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § § 17-19,27 (1982)).
406. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 17).
407. Id. at 748-49 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27).
408. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17(1), 18(1),24(1), with id. § 27.

409. Id.§ 17 (emphasis added).
410. Id. § 27.
411. See id. § 30(3).
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2. The Narrow Preclusive Effect of a Chapter 7 Discharge Order
The Restatement provides that:
[a] valid and final judgment in an action based only on
jurisdiction to determine interests in a thing... [i]s
conclusive as to those interests with regard to all persons, if
the judgment purports to have that effect (traditionally
described as "in rem"). . . and... [i]s conclusive between
parties, in accordance with the rules of issue preclusion, as
to any issues actually litigated by them and determined in
the action. 412
A bankruptcy court's entry of a discharge order constitutes the court's
exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to issue a judgment declaring the
debtor's status
as a discharged debtor,413 and such an order is a final
414
judgment.
Because an in rem discharge order declares the debtor's status as a
discharged debtor, it is conclusive on this point with regard to all
persons. 415 A Chapter 7 discharge order, however, does not specify
which debts the court has discharged.416 When a debtor initiates, postdischarge and for the first time, an adversary proceeding to determine
the dischargeability of a student loan, the issue of undue hardship
presented by the debtor in her complaint is one that will never have
been actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment-the
trigger for issue preclusion. Indeed, the issue of undue hardship is
irrelevant for purposes of whether a Chapter 7 debtor will be granted a
discharge.417 Accordingly, because a Chapter 7 discharge order is not
conclusive as between the debtor and the student-loan creditor with
respect to the undue hardship issue, the order will not bar
the debtor
418
from litigating it in a post-discharge adversary proceeding.

412. Id. § 30(1), (3).
413. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 241 (1934); Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1902); James Win. Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1, 23 (1958); cf Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,
541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) ("The discharge of a debt by a bankruptcy court is.. . an in rem
proceeding.").
414. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2008),
aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).
415. Moore, supra note 413, at 23-24.
416. See Official Form 18 ("Discharge of Debtor"), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BKForms 1207/B 018_1207.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
417. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)-(12) (2012) (setting forth the grounds for the denial of a
Chapter 7 discharge); infra notes 430-32 and accompanying text.
418. See Moore, supra note 413, at 23 & n.116,24 & n.120.
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3. Counterfactual: A Chapter 7 Discharge Order Is the Product of an In
Personam Proceeding
Assuming for the sake of argument that a discharge order is a valid
and final personal judgment (i.e., the product of an in personam
proceeding), the possibility arises that the order could have claimpreclusive effect between the parties-specifically, 4precluding litigation
of a matter that has never been litigated before.
But even on this
assumption, the discharge order would not have claim preclusive effect
on an undue hardship adversary proceeding for one of two reasons: a
debtor's Chapter 7 case and his undue hardship adversary proceeding do
not involve the same claim; or, in the alternative, even if they do, a key
exception to claim preclusion applies given the relevant facts in this
context.
a. A Chapter 7 Case and an Undue Hardship Adversary Proceeding Do
Not Involve the Same Claim
One of the essential elements of claim preclusion is that "the same
claim or cause of action was involved in both suits.' 420 To determine
whether the same claim or cause of action was involved in both suits, a
court must consider four criteria:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior
judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of
the second action; (2) whether substantially the same
evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the
two suits involve infringement of the same right; and
(4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transaction
or nucleus of facts. 42 '
Of the four factors, the last is the most important.422 In answering
whether two suits arise out of the same transaction of facts, the
Restatement provides that the answer is "to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms
to
423
usage.'
or
understanding
business
or
expectations
parties'
the
419. See, e.g., Rein v. Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17(1), 18(1), 24(1) (1982).
420. Rein, 270 F.3d at 899.
421. Id. at903.
422. Id. at 904 (citing C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cit.

1995)).
423.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
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The first factor-that the rights or interests established in the prior
judgment would be destroyed or impaired by the prosecution of the
second action-is not implicated in this context. A debtor's undue
hardship complaint is an action for a declaratory judgment by the
bankruptcy court that her student loan is of the type that imposes an
undue hardship and thus falls within the scope of her Chapter 7
discharge. 424 In other words, the debtor's complaint seeks a declaration
of the rights conferred by the discharge order 425-the prior judgmentand would not destroy or impair any previously established right. 26
Nothing about the "self-executing" nature of the Bankruptcy Code's
undue hardship provision changes this analysis. As the Supreme Court
has observed:
[Section] 523(a)(8) requires a court to make a certain
finding before confirming the discharge of a student loan
debt. It is true, as we explained in Hood, that this
requirement is "self-executing." But that means only that
the bankruptcy court must make an undue42hardship
finding
7
even if the creditor does not request one[.]
The Court's use of the phrase "confirming the discharge of a student
loan debt" comports with the view that an undue hardship adversary
proceeding merely entails declaratory relief for a pre-existing rightthat the scope of the original discharge order included the student loan
at issue in the adversary proceeding. In light of the declaratory nature
of the relief sought by a debtor in a dischargeability determination,429
the adversary proceeding does not destroy or impair the rights or
interests established in the original discharge order.
The second factor-that substantially the same evidence is presented
in the two actions-is not implicated in this context. A court must grant
an individual debtor a Chapter 7 discharge unless one of the grounds for
denying a discharge exists.43 ° If such a ground exists, a party must
generally commence an adversary proceeding by filing a complaint
424. See O'Brien v. First Marblehead Educ. Res., Inc. (In re O'Brien), 419 F.3d 104, 105
(2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Keenom v. All Am. Mktg. (In re Keenom), 231 B.R. 116, 125
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999); In re Anderson, 72 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
425. See In re Anderson, 72 B.R. at 497.
426. See Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 427 B.R. 471, 479 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2010).
427. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1379 (2010) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450
(2004)).

428. See In re Anderson, 72 B.R. at 496; David Gray Carlson, The Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure in Reorganization Cases: Do They Have a Constitutional Dimension?,
84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251, 277 (2010).

429. See In re Anderson, 72 B.R. at 497.
430. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012).
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against the debtor.4 3 ' In the absence of an objection, the only evidence a
debtor may need to submit as a condition to obtaining a discharge is "a
statement of completion of a course concerning personal financial
management" and certain tax documents. 432 Because a debtor must
present a great deal more evidence in substantiating a claim of undue
hardship, it would strain credulity to say that the underlying bankruptcy
case and the adversary proceeding have substantial evidentiary overlap.
The third factor-whether the two suits involve infringement of the
same right-is not implicated in this context. As set forth above, the
grant of a Chapter 7 discharge depends on an individual debtor's
statutory eligibility for such a discharge. Through an undue hardship
adversary proceeding, a debtor seeks a declaratory order regarding the
scope of his Chapter 7 discharge, specifically, whether or not his student
loan was already discharged. Accordingly, distinct rights are involved in
the underlying bankruptcy case and the adversary proceeding.433
Finally, the fourth factor-that the two suits arise out of the same
transaction or nucleus of facts-is also not implicated in this context. A
bankruptcy case is a collective proceeding that "serves as the
4 34
administrative mechanism by which the debtor receives a discharge.'
The court must grant an individual debtor a Chapter 7 discharge unless
she falls within a particular class of individual, usually defined by
reference to a limited set of circumstances that relate to debtor fraud or
misconduct in connection with the bankruptcy case. 435 An undue
hardship adversary proceeding, however, involves a much narrower
subset of all parties to the bankruptcy case and is often a two-party
dispute involving only the debtor and the student-loan creditor. In such
a proceeding, the debtor must establish either (1) in jurisdictions
following the Brunner test, that he has a current and future inability to
repay the student loan and that he has made a good faith effort to do
so;436 or (2) in jurisdictions following the totality test, "that (1) his past,
present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) his and
his dependents' reasonably necessary living expenses; and (3) other
relevant facts or circumstances unique to the case, prevent him from
paying the student loans in question while still maintaining a minimal

431. See FED. R. BANKR P. 4004(a), 7001(4), 7003.
432. FED. R. BANKR P. 4004(c)(1)(H), (L). These requirements were promulgated in 2008.
See FED. R. BANKR P. 4004 advisory committee notes.

433. See Moore, supra note 413, at 23 & n.116.
434. Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 908, 910 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added).
435. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
436. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 111112 (9th Cir. 1998).
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standard of living. 4 37 Given these contrasts, a Chapter 7 case and an
undue hardship adversary proceeding simply do not arise from facts that
are substantially related in time, space, origin, or motivation. Nor do a
Chapter 7 case and an adversary proceeding form a convenient trial
unit.438

Because the four essential factors for claim preclusion are either
absent or marginally present in this context, an assumption that a
Chapter 7 discharge order results from an in personam proceeding
would not lead to the conclusion that the discharge order has claim
preclusive effect between the parties to the adversary proceeding.
b. The Statutory-Scheme Exception to Claim Preclusion
Assuming for the sake of argument that a Chapter 7 case and an
undue hardship adversary proceeding involve part or all of the same
claim, a critical exception to claim preclusion applies in this context that
courts should not overlook. 439 The Restatement's provision on
exceptions to claim preclusion, upon which the Supreme Court and the
U.S. Courts of Appeals have relied, 440 states that if one of six
circumstances exists, a valid and final judgment from the first action
will not extinguish the original claim, "and part or all of the claim
subsists as a possible
basis for a second action by the plaintiff against
44 1
defendant."
the
This particular context triggers the statutory-scheme exception,
which applies when "it is the sense of the [statutory] scheme that the
plaintiff should be permitted to split his claim. ' 442 Specifically, it is the

437. Lorenz v. Am. Educ. Servs./Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Lorenz), 337
B.R. 423,430 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006).
438. See In re Menk, 241 B.R. at 907-08; cf Christopher Klein et al., Principles of
Preclusion and Estoppel in Bankruptcy Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839, 888 (2005) ("[A]
confirmation hearing is a collective proceeding that necessarily involves all parties to the
bankruptcy case and is not an occasion for efficiently resolving two-party disputes that may
require trial.").
439. See Klein et al., supra note 438, at 874 ("Another puzzle in preclusion cases is a
tendency to bypass the recognized exceptions to Imposition of preclusion. If the stated

exceptions are ignored, preclusion may wind up being imposed in situations that should not lead
to the litigant being deprived of a legitimate day in court.").
440. See, e.g., Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(c) (1982)); Klipsch, Inc. v. WWR Tech.,
Inc., 127 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1997) ("The District Court erred in its decision not to follow
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 26(1)(a)."); Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 59 F.3d
852, 862 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(a)-(b)).
441. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1).
442. Id. § 26(l)(d); cf Maxwell v. Mich. Fidelity Acceptance Corp. (In re Maestas), 354
B.R. 844, 846-47 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26(l)(d) to conclude that, "in view of the separate and distinct statutes of limitations for
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"sense of the statutory scheme" that a Chapter 7 debtor may bring an
adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt
subsequent to the grant of discharge. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that
"[a] debtor... may file a complaint to obtain a determination of the
dischargeability of any debt ' 443 and that the complaint "may be filed at
any time. '444 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Rules clearly contemplate the
initiation of such an adversary proceeding subsequent to the entry of a
discharge order by providing that "[a] case may be reopened. . . for the
purpose of filing a complaint to obtain a determination under this
rule., 44 5 Thus, the Bankruptcy Rules should prompt application of the
statutory-scheme exception,46 with the result that a Chapter 7 discharge
order does not have claim preclusive effect on an undue hardship
adversary proceeding.
D. The Harm Caused by ECMC's Litigation Conduct
One might be inclined to readily dismiss the foregoing examples
because they are isolated incidents and do not impose much, if any,
harm on the debtor. This Article flatly rejects this argument. This
Article has made the theoretical case, bolstered by empirical evidence,
that the access-to-justice barriers faced by debtors in undue hardship
litigation are significant and daunting. 447 Such barriers alone impede a
debtor's ability to attain the benefits of bankruptcy's fresh start.
ECMC's conduct further exacerbates those barriers.
It is entirely conceivable that ECMC's procedural noncompliance
and pollutive litigation decrease a debtor's odds of prevailing in those
proceedings where such litigation conduct occurs. But even if ECMC's
conduct does not impose much harm in certain individual cases,
aggregating the conduct will reveal something akin to a public-health
epidemic, one that undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system.
Put another way, when focusing narrowly on certain individual cases,
the harm may not seem substantial, but when viewing the group of cases
broadly, it matters very much. The pattern that emerges calls into
question the system's commitment to ensuring that debtors who suffer
undue hardship obtain relief from their educational debt.
[Bankruptcy Code] §§ 547 and 550, respectively, and consistent with the sense of the statutory
scheme, that this second adversary is an exception to resjudicata").
443. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a) (emphasis added).
444. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b) (emphasis added).
445. Id.; see also Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 908, 911 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1999) ("The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that various activities may occur after closing [of
the case].... The discharge status of various debts may, as in the instant appeal, need to be
determined." (emphasis added)).
446. See Klein et al., supra note 438, at 875 n.122.
447. See supra Part I; supra Section II.A.
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CONCLUSION

In order to restrain procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation
in undue hardship adversary proceedings, change will have to come
from the trial courts in the bankruptcy system. Such change is unlikely
to come from Congress, bankruptcy professionals, or appellate courts in
the bankruptcy system for several reasons.
First and foremost, Congress has not demonstrated any inclination to
take serious action in reforming student-loan relief through the
bankruptcy system. Since the Bankruptcy Code's enactment in 1978,448
Congress has repeatedly amended the Code's student-loandischargeability provision to make it more restrictive-less forgiving
toward debtors-in one of two ways: (1) broadening the types of debts
that qualify as student loans that are conditionally dischargeable or
(2) narrowing the conditions under which such debts may be
discharged.4 Granted, since Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code
in 2005 to make private student loans conditionally dischargeable (upon
a showing of undue hardship) rather than automatically
dischargeable, 450 some of its members have introduced various bills to
restore the pre-2005 automatically dischargeable status of private
student loans.45 1Nonetheless, Congress has failed to enact any of those
bills. Moreover, the focus on the dischargeable status of private student
loans is quite narrow and does nothing to address issues relating to
(1) the clarification of the undue hardship standard or (2) the access-tojustice barriers discussed in Part I. Even if Congress restored the pre2005 automatically dischargeable status of private student loans, given
that such loans constitute only a small percentage of total student-loan
debt,452 this would leave a huge swath of debtors litigating their undue
448. See supra note 4.
449. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 41, at 427
& n. 116. For a comprehensive discussion about the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code's
student-loan-dischargeability provision, see id. at 419-28.
450. In using the phrase "private student loan," this Article specifically refers to an
"educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual." 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8)(B) (2012). Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 to include such loans
among the types of educational debt that can discharged only upon a showing of undue
hardship. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)). Prior to 2005, such debts were
automatically dischargeable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000) (amended 2005).
451. See, e.g., Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 532, 113th
Cong. (2013); Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, S. 114, 113th Cong. (2013); Private
Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 2028, 112th Cong. (2011); Private Student
Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2010, H.R. 5043, 11 1th Cong. (2010); S. 1561, 110th Cong.
(2007).
452. See, e.g., DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET
PROPOSAL, at S-19 (2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budgetl4/
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hardship claims for relief under a vague and indeterminate standard.
These debtors would still face the extant procedural hurdles that plague
the system today. At best, Congress might engage in modest reform
efforts. At worst, Congress will do nothing.
Second, although bankruptcy professionals may be situated to
reform the system in some circumstances,454 I am not sanguine about
their ability to do so within the context of undue hardship litigation. It is
unfortunate but true that the access-to-justice barriers confronted by
debtors create a non-level playing field that tilts in favor of student-loan
creditors. Given the adversarial and recursive nature of the litigation
process, the professionals representing such creditors have no incentive
to engage in system reform that would level the playing field.
On the other hand, attorneys who represent student-loan debtors
might have an incentive to reform the system. Assuming that they do,
the membership of this group is likely to be small, diffuse, and unlikely
to have a great deal of financial resources at its disposal to advocate for
reform. Moreover, given that the quality of lawyering on behalf of
student-loan debtors is not likely to be robust, 455 debtors' attorneys are
not prime candidates to engage in courtroom advocacy that seeks
modification or reversal of the case law governing the undue hardship
standard. Thus, exhortations by the judiciary for such advocacy 456 are
likely to fall on deaf ears.
Organizations dedicated to protecting debtors' rights-the National
Consumer Law Center (NCLC) or the National Association of
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA), for instance-may be
better situated to effectuate change. And, in fact, NCLC routinely
advocates for relief for student-loan borrowers, including bankruptcy
relief.457 Nonetheless, the student-loan lobby representing creditors
undoubtedly has greater economic resources than nonprofit
justifications/s-loansoverview.pdf. The federal government disbursed over $106 billion in
federal student loans during the 2012 fiscal year. See FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 181, at 8.
As of June 2013, the outstanding balance for Direct loans was $569.2 billion, and the
outstanding balance for FFELP loans was $429.5 billion. See Rohit Chopra, A Closer Look at
the

Trillion,

CONSUMER

FIN.

PROT.

BUREAU

BLOG

(Aug.

5,

2013),

http://www.consumerfinance.goviblog/a-closer-look-at-the-trillion/. On the difference between
Direct loans and FFELP loans, see supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
453. For further discussion casting doubt on Congress's ability to engage in effective
reform efforts that would improve deficiencies in the bankruptcy system, see Melissa B. Jacoby,
The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR.

L.J. 221, 221-30 (2004).
454. See id. at 236-37.
455. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
456. See, e.g., Bene v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bene), 474 B.R. 56, 68 n.12
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012).
457. See Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Advocacy, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE,
http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/advocacy/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
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organizations that advocate on behalf of student-loan borrowers. For
this reason, nonprofits will likely face stiff resistance in their reform
efforts, thereby decreasing their likelihood of effectuating change.
If congressionally mandated change is unlikely, and if bankruptcy
professionals will not be instrumental in effectuating change, then the
judiciary stands as the last bastion for reforming the system. The
bankruptcy litigation system, however, consists of various courts:
bankruptcy courts at the trial level, district courts and bankruptcy
appellate panels (BAPs) at the first tier of intermediate appellate review,
courts of appeals at the second tier of intermediate appellate review, and
the Supreme Court at the apex with discretionary final appellate
review.458 If the "ultimate [residual] policymaking power [in
bankruptcy] does not rest with the expert bankruptcy judges but rather
with those judges exercising appellate review, 4 59 then why have I
concluded that change in this context must come from the bankruptcy
courts rather than the appellate courts?
As a practical matter, by virtue of the two tiers of intermediate
appellate review in the bankruptcy litigation system, appellate-level
policy making is quite limited due to the infrequency with which
appeals make their way to the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals,
which are best situated to issue binding precedent. 460 The Supreme
Court has only heard two cases involving the discharge of student loans
in bankruptcy, 46 1 and the issues tackled by the Court were procedural.462
Notably, when presented with the opportunity to clarify the meaning of
undue hardship, the Court declined to do so. 4 63 Moreover, during the
fifteen-year period spanning 1997 through 2011, the courts of appeals
issued only forty-six opinions relating to trial-level dispositions of
adversary proceedings that sought a dischargeability determination of
student loans in bankruptcy.464 Finally, while courts at the first tier 465
of
intermediate appellate review hear the bulk of bankruptcy appeals,
458. See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The StructuralExceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 424-27 & 426 fig.l (2012).

459. See id.
at 425..
460. See id. at 438-39.

461. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. 1367 (2010); Tenn. Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
462. See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1373; Hood, 541 U.S. at 445.

463. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Reynolds, 549
U.S. 811 (2006) (No. 05-1361), 2006 WL 1126177; Reynolds, 549 U.S. at 811.
464. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking the Principal-Agent Theory of

Judging, 99 IOWA L. REV. 331, 348-50 (2013). The forty-six opinions consist of both published
and unpublished opinions; they also consist of opinions disposing of the appeal on the merits as
well as opinions involving solely procedural dispositions (e.g., dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
or for lack of standing). See id. at 350.
465. See Pardo & Watts, supra note 458, at 438.
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the opinions issued by district courts and BAPs have limited
precedential value. 466 This state of affairs illustrates how "the current
structure of bankruptcy administration is poorly designed to achieve
467
uniform, clear answers" to open-ended questions under the Code,
including what the meaning of "undue hardship" should be for purposes
of determining the dischargeability of student loans.4 6 8
If this is true, why do I hold out hope that reform will flow from the
bankruptcy courts? After all, any decision-making by bankruptcy judges
at the trial level will generally lack precedential effect. 4 69 This is true
enough. But this Article has primarily focused on highlighting the
manner in which procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation
have amplified the access-to-justice barriers that prevent student-loan
debtors from obtaining a fresh start. By shining a spotlight on such
mistakes and misbehavior, I hope that, going forward, bankruptcy
judges will be better situated to play a more robust monitoring role in
undue hardship adversary proceedings and thus to serve as a check
against any attempts by creditors to run roughshod over student-loan
debtor's procedural rights.
Should bankruptcy judges be expected to serve such a monitoring
role? Absolutely. The suggested monitoring role fits squarely within the
mandate set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Bankruptcy Procedure that procedural rules should be administered to
secure just determinations.
If courts have had a vigilant eye toward
enforcing creditors' procedural rights,47' then they should also exercise
vigilance in enforcing debtors' procedural rights.
466. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An EmpiricalInvestigation into Appellate
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1745, 1761-62,
1761 nn.68-73 (2008) (discussing the precedential effect of district court and BAP opinions).
467. Pardo & Watts, supra note 458, at 439.
468. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 657-58 (2002).
469. See, e.g., In re 400 Madison Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 213 B.R. 888, 890 n.2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1997); In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, 160 B.R.
882, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Jones, 112 B.R. 975, 977 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
470. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.

471. See, e.g., Scott v. United States (In re Scott), 437 B.R. 376, 380 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2010); Dismissal Order, In re Watkins, supra note 306 (dismissing undue hardship adversary
proceeding with respect to one defendant based on improper service of summons and
complaint); Order Regarding Improper Service of Summons and Complaint on Defendant(s),
Hoefer v. ACS College Loan Corp., (In re Hoefer), Ch. 7 Case No. 10-71401, Adv. No. 1104084 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2011), ECF No. 3; Dismissal Order, Reslink v. ECMC, supra
note 251, at 1 (dismissing debtor's complaint without prejudice on the basis that the original
complaint "fails to comply with [Bankruptcy Rule 7010] regarding the content of pleadings filed
in adversary matters").
472. Importantly, the monitoring role would comport with the tendency of bankruptcy
judges to be actively involved in case management. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 32, at
966; Stacy Kleiner Humphries & Robert L. R. Munden, Paintinga Self-Portrait:A Look at the
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The importance of a debtor's procedural rights should not be
underestimated. If we conceptualize the value of a debtor's substantive
rights-here, the entitlement to a discharge of student loans that impose
undue hardship-to be inversely related to the extent to which
procedure acts as a barrier to vindicating the substantive right,473 then
the value of the substantive right will be increasingly diminished if
bankruptcy judges do not engage in more robust procedural monitoring.
Judges should not underestimate the potential of such monitoring to
have a positive impact on effectuating change for student-loan debtors.
The world of undue hardship litigation is not a world of trials; it is
overwhelmingly a world of settlements and other pretrial dispositions
(e.g., dismissals).474 Accordingly, the real opportunity for reform lies in
the ability of bankruptcy judges to achieve just results through
managerial judging.475 This approach ought to have great appeal for
judges who feel frustrated by Congress's failure to revisit its policy
regarding the dischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy or who
feel that the decisional law governing application of the undue hardship
standard has been excessively constraining.476
At the end of the day, "[t]he cogs of the wheel of justice move much
more smoothly when attorneys... follow the rules of practice and
procedure., 477 The undue hardship thicket can be cleared, but it will
require bankruptcy courts to accept more responsibility in policing for
procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation.

Composition and Style of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 76, 82, 105 (1997);

Janger, supra note 3 1, at 587.
473. Cf Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) ("Suffice it to say that actually in many situations procedure and substance are so
interwoven that rational separation becomes well-nigh impossible."); Richard D. Freer, The
Continuing Gloom About Federal JudicialRulemaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 447, 451 (2013)

("[T]here is no hermetic seal; procedural provisions routinely affect the enforcement of
substantive rights.").
474. See supra Part II.
475. See E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CIE.
L. REV. 306, 325-26, 335 (1986).
476. See, e.g., Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 920 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2013) (Pappas, J., concurring); Wolfe v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Wolfe), 501 B.R.
426, 434 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013); Armstrong v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Armstrong), Ch. 7
Case No. 10-82092, Adv. No. 10-8118, 2011 WL 6779326, at *9 n.13 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
Dec. 27,

2011).
477. Dela Rosa v. Scottsdale Mem'l Health Sys., Inc., 136 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998).
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